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Boards of directors are integral to the modern corporation and therefore 
frequently studied. However, recent corporate scandals as well as mixed empirical 
findings about the impact of board structure highlit the fact that there is still much to 
learn. The purpose of this dissertation is to incorporate the concepts of board-level human 
and social capital into research on corporate governance by proposing and developing the 
construct of director capabilities. I argue that corporate governance research must go 
beyond its traditional focus on structural independence to truly understand board 
effectiveness. In addition, I question the assumption present in virtually all prior research 
on corporate governance that outside directors havethe ability to monitor and participate 
in strategic decision making. To do so, I draw upon a range of theories including human 
and social capital, information processing, incentives, and learning. By expanding our 
understanding of board effectiveness to include the capabilities of the directors, this 
dissertation provides a framework that should help governance researchers find more 
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consistent relationships between corporate governance d firm performance. In addition, 
this dissertation examines some determinants of directo  capabilities by examining how 
current governance trends and proposed independence r forms may negatively impact 
directors’ willingness to serve on boards. I argue that recent actions that are supposed to 
improve boards may actually negatively impact boards by decreasing the overall quality 
of directors who choose to serve. I tested my hypotheses using archival data collected on 
650 firms randomly sampled from the Fortune 1000 over the years 2000 through 2004. 
This resulted in a unique data set on the human and social capital of more than 5700 
corporate directors. 
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INTRODUCTION TO BOTH STUDIES 
 
Boards of directors are of central importance to both practitioners and researchers. 
Directors and executives lead the massive modern corporations that dominate the global 
economy. Directors are often successful businessmen and women and are potentially 
quite powerful, and this combination creates a uniqe mystique around them. The 
purpose of this dissertation is to probe this mystique and examine boards from a novel 
perspective. The broad focus of this dissertation is to understand how director capabilities 
influence board effectiveness and in turn, what factors influence the selection and 
retention of these capabilities. Most previous work n board effectiveness has examined 
the issue from a limited set of perspectives, primaily through the lens of agency theory, 
but also using resource dependence and behavioral perspectives. Agency theory 
perspectives emphasize agency factors, like the independence of directors from 
management, that relate to the motivation of directors o serve shareholders.  
This research is driven by the agency problem that arises because of the 
separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation (Berle & Means, 1932). 
Because the interests of the owners of the firm may not be perfectly aligned with the 
interests of the managers of the firm, managers may act in ways that are not in the best 
interests of shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Governance research from an 
agency perspective looks at ways of correcting this problem usually through attempting 
to align the interests of managers with shareholders, or through the use of monitoring 
mechanisms such as independent directors. Resource dependence perspectives focus on 
the board’s potential to help the firm gain access to necessary resources. Behavioral 
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perspectives have often focused on how the power of directors affects their ability to 
contribute to the board. However, by focusing primaly on these factors, what has been 
left unexplored is a broader human resource perspective of the board that considers 
whether and when directors have the capabilities to make valuable contributions to the 
firm.  
Therefore, my first research question is: How do director capabilities, and factors 
that influence these capabilities, affect board effectiveness? Specifically, I am interested 
in how the human and social capital of the board, in combination with the incentives and 
information load of the board contribute to firm performance. Having established that 
director capabilities are important determinants of b ard effectiveness, I also consider 
how factors that have been emphasized in the literature and by stakeholders as primary 
determinants of board effectiveness may influence the selection and retention of board-
level capabilities This leads to my second question: How are efforts intended to improve 
board independence affecting the level of human and social capital on those boards? Why 
might efforts that are aimed at improving board effectiveness actually hurt board quality? 
In this dissertation I develop two separate papers that address these two questions.  
The broad purpose of this dissertation is to address the research questions above 
by incorporating the concepts of board human and social capital into research on 
corporate governance. Corporate governance research h s often focused on the structure 
of the board without also looking at the capabilities of the board. Governance research 
has usually examined the board from an agency and/or power perspective, and has often 
excluded human resource explanations for board effectiveness. This dissertation seeks to 
expand our understanding of effective governance by exploring the factors that may 
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influence the level of human and social capital on a board, and by better understanding 
how human and social capital of the board may influence firm performance (Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003). In order to do this, I have structured the dissertation into two separate 
papers. Study one develops a comprehensive model of board effectiveness that 
incorporates human and social capital constructs. This model is presented below as 
Figure 1. Study two explores how board independence will impact subsequent levels of 





STUDY ONE: DEVELOPING THE CONSTRUCT OF DIRECTOR 
CAPABILITIES INTO A MODEL OF BOARD EFFECTIVENESS 
 
Introduction 
Given the position of boards at the apex of the corporation, they have the potential 
to exert considerable influence. Therefore, it is clearly important to understand the role of 
directors in influencing these firms. However, it is also clear that what directors actually 
do and how effective they are at doing it varies significantly across firms (Lorsch & 
MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1986). Because of the importance and impact of large public 
companies, deficiencies in the level or quality of monitoring or advice giving by boards 
may have serious consequences for firms and their sareholders.  
The importance of boards has not been unnoticed by researchers. Subsequent to 
Berle and Means’ (1932) insight into problems that could arise because of the separation 
of ownership and control in the modern corporation, a  extensive literature has arisen 
around the question of board effectiveness (see Zajac & Westphal, 2002 for a review). 
Much of the research on boards has drawn upon agency theory to suggest that the 
purpose of the board is to oversee management and to monitor managerial action on 
behalf of shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989). This research has examined boards by looking 
at the structure of the board and inferring board effectiveness from that structure (Boeker 
& Goodstein, 1993; Kosnik, 1987). It is believed that boards filled with a greater 
percentage of outside, independent directors will be more effective (Mizruchi, 1983). 
This general proposition is also advanced in the lit rature on board power (Boeker, 
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1992). The power perspective on boards argues that boards filled with outsiders who are 
not beholden to management for their pay or position will have greater power, and will 
therefore combat the actions of self-interested managers (Boeker, 1992; Finkelstein & 
D'Aveni, 1994; Ocasio, 1994; Pearce & Zahra, 1991; Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Zajac & 
Westphal, 1996).  
A different stream of research on boards has drawn upon the theory of resource 
dependence to suggest that the purpose of the board is to help the firm gain access to 
important resources (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). More recently another 
stream of research has arisen that adds additional nsight into the issue of boards; it 
introduces ideas from a sociological perspective to xplain the purpose and the actions of 
boards of directors (Westphal, 1998, 1999; Westphal & Milton, 2000; Westphal & Zajac, 
1998; Zajac & Westphal, 1994). One of the primary conclusions of this research is that an 
effective board may do more than just monitor executive action. Effective boards may 
also provide ongoing help and advice in strategic decision making (Westphal, 1999).  
However, there is still uncertainty as to what contributes to board effectiveness. 
Work in the corporate governance literature suggests that there is a high degree of 
variation between boards in the level at which boards actually impact firm functioning, 
with regard to monitoring and to advice giving (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1986). 
Reviews of the literature on structural independence have concluded that there is little 
evidence that increased independence actually improves board functioning and 
subsequent firm performance (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Westphal, 
1998). However, despite the mixed prior results, even the most recent empirical articles 
continue to assume that outsider-dominated boards signify effective governance 
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(Chatterjee, Harrison, & Bergh, 2003; Tihanyi, Johnso , Hoskisson, & Hitt, 2003). In 
addition, much of the literature on boards from a behavioral perspective has not examined 
board effectiveness directly, but has instead focused on indicators such as board 
involvement (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Westphal, 1999). This indicates that there is 
much still to learn about board effectiveness. 
Another potential problem is that virtually all corp rate governance research rests 
on an assumption that may be unrealistic. Specifically, corporate governance research 
from agency, power, resource dependence, and sociologica  perspectives all rest on the 
primary assumption that outside directors have the ability to monitor and participate in 
strategic decision making. While it may be safe to assume that directors have some 
ability and some desire, research from a number of perspectives suggests that we must 
question the universality of this assumption. For instance, work on boards from an 
agency perspective (for a review see Eisenhardt, 1989) relies on some of the principles 
and assumptions of an economic view of individuals. The economic view assumes that 
individual directors have the ability to gather, interpret, and process the large amounts of 
information relevant to the proper functioning of the companies on whose boards they sit, 
and that they are able to monitor and control the actions of executives in order to ensure 
that these actions will benefit shareholders. However, work in behavioral decision theory 
suggests that individuals are decidedly bounded in their rationality (Cyert & March, 
1963) and that they are subject to limitations in their cognitive abilities (Tripsas & 
Gavetti, 2000). This bounded rationality should inhibit director’s ability to complete their 
board duties effectively.  
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Taken together, the research discussed above suggests that we have more to learn 
about board effectiveness and that researchers mustquestion not only the desire of 
directors to monitor, but also their ability to do s . One of the limitations of prior research 
is that it focused primarily on characteristics of b ards like structural independence and 
linked independence to motivation, while not considering capabilities of boards. 
However, by developing a model of board effectiveness that includes director capabilities 
we should be better able to find stable linkages betwe n the board and firm performance. 
Both the ability of the board and the desire of the board to contribute effectively to the 
firm are likely to vary across firms, and therefore it is important to develop a 
comprehensive model regarding the sources of this variation. This leads to the primary 
research question of this study: What factors contribute to directors’ capabilities and how 
do these factors influence board effectiveness? I expect that in order to answer this 
question we must go beyond the current focus on board independence. Focusing on the 
structure of the board ignores the importance of director capabilities. Therefore, in order 
to answer this question I am drawing upon the theories of human and social capital as 
well as theories on motivation and information processing. Together, these theoretical 
perspectives will provide insight into director capabilities that should help us better 
predict board effectiveness. 
Human capital is a type of capital or resource thatis embedded within individuals 
(Becker, 1962). It is similar to skill or experience (Harris & Helfat, 1997). Human capital 
is the result of specific investments that individuals make by giving up time or other 
valuable resources to improve themselves. Examples of common measures of human 
capital include education and task relevant experience. In this study I draw upon theories 
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of human capital as one way of explaining board effectiveness. Human capital of the 
board should be a useful proxy for the ability of the board to contribute to monitoring and 
advice-giving.  
Social capital is the goodwill that individuals are ble to draw on by virtue of their 
social relations to gain access to information and influence (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Social 
capital results from relationships that individuals build and manage. Social capital is 
another factor that may contribute to board effectiv ness. Boards filled with directors 
with high levels of social capital may have the necessary information and influence to do 
their job properly. 
In addition to human and social capital I will be including theory on motivation 
and information processing demands, and how these two factors interact with the human 
and social capital of the board. Motivated directors should be more effective than 
unmotivated directors. For example, early work on governance stressed the idea that 
boards should be composed primarily of outsiders who are independent from 
management (Mizruchi, 1983). The underlying assumption is that outsiders who are 
beholden to CEOs will lack the desire to effectively monitor executive action (Westphal, 
1999). While the motivation of directors is important to consider, as prior research has 
shown, motivation must be considered in concert with ability in order to understand 
performance (Mitchell, 1997). Motivation therefore, is expected to have an interactive 
relationship with director human and social capital. Information processing demands 
should also play an important role in boards’ ability to function effectively because 
directors need to be able to interpret and process the large volumes of information they 
are presented with.  
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PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED RESEARCH 
The purpose of the proposed research is to better understand the determinants of 
board effectiveness and the relationships between those determinants. To do this I will 
develop a comprehensive model of board effectiveness intended to contribute to our 
understanding of the capability of boards to meaningfully contribute to the governance of 
the modern corporation. I plan to examine board effectiveness by examining director 
capabilities using a human resources framework where executives and directors are seen 
as valuable repositories of skill and experience. Specifically, this research focuses on 
developing a model of board effectiveness that is applicable to the largest public firms.  
This study will address four primary research question  related to board 
effectiveness: (1) Does the level of human and social capital on a firm’s board contribute 
to improved firm performance?, (2) Does the level of motivation of a firm’s board 
members contribute to improved firm performance?, (3) Does the level of information 
processing demands of a firm’s board contribute to decreased firm performance?, (4) Are 
there interactive relationships between the effects of human and social capital and 
motivation and information processing demands that affect firm performance? Below, I 
outline how the answers to these four research questions will contribute to organization 
theory.  
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE PROPOSED RESEARCH 
The primary contribution of this study is the development of a more 
comprehensive model of board effectiveness that develops the construct of director 
capabilities. Previous governance research on boards has usually focused on board 
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characteristics considered important in an agency framework, such as structural 
independence, to predict firm performance, and often with mixed results (Dalton et al., 
1998). I am arguing that the mixed past results may also be the result of a failure to 
consider director capabilities. By expanding our understanding of board effectiveness to 
include the capabilities of the directors, this study provides a framework that should help 
governance researchers find more consistent relationsh ps between corporate governance 
and firm performance. Using director capabilities highlights the importance of examining 
directors using a human resources perspective, where directors’ skills and experiences 
may provide unique contributions to the firm. Having a model that incorporates this 
critical construct should also help to strengthen the predictive link between the board and 
higher firm performance. It is the introduction of the construct of director capabilities that 
should help create a more powerful model of board effectiveness and makes this study 
valuable. 
Through the development of the construct of director capabilities, this study 
makes a secondary contribution by highlighting the w akness of one of the core 
assumptions in the corporate governance literature. Virtually all research on corporate 
governance has assumed the capability of directors (see Hillman & Dalziel, 2003 for an 
exception). Specifically, research on boards from agency perspectives, resource 
dependence perspectives, and behavioral perspectives all assume that directors are 
capable of monitoring management and otherwise contributing to corporate governance. 
However, all of these streams of research have faild to test this assumption. This is 
particularly important, especially given the mixed past results mentioned above. By 
probing and developing a better understanding of one f the primary assumptions 
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underlying corporate governance research this dissertation makes an important 
contribution.  
In suggesting the importance of director capabilities to board effectiveness, this 
research makes an additional contribution to the lit rature on corporate governance 
through its use of theory and constructs that are relatively novel in this area of inquiry. 
Theory on human and social capital has received limited attention in the boards literature 
and has never been empirically tested (Certo, 2003; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). In 
addition, theory on information processing demands ha never been applied directly to 
the board. By drawing upon and expanding different theoretical perspectives this paper 
helps to expand the range of theory available to governance researchers. 
There are also a number of other smaller contributions made by this research. This 
study adds value to the literature on human and social capital by incorporating them into 
one model. These two concepts, while related, are usually examined separately. This 
research also contributes to the literature on corporate governance through the use of a 
unique mix of archival empirical data, primary survey data, and qualitative interviews 
with actual directors. This multimethod design incorporates rich qualitative interviews 
with empirical theory testing and allows this research to make a practical contribution as 
well as a scholarly contribution. The constructs and model tested here have implications 
both for practicing directors and for firms looking to improve their board effectiveness.  
Theory Development and Hypotheses 
 
In this section, I present theory and develop hypotheses related to the various 
model components of Figure 1. The focus here is on the board as a unit and how it affects 
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the firm. This is similar to other theorizing on boards of directors as decision-making 
units (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). It is important to note that I am proposing a 
comprehensive model that explains the ability of a given board to fulfill its duties 
effectively. Previous studies of boards have examined many different structural and 
social factors that may impact board functioning, but they have not put them together into 
one comprehensive model (see Zajac & Westphal, 2002for a recent review). In addition, 
prior research on board effectiveness has had mixed success demonstrating that board 
characteristics, like independence, predict firm performance (Dalton et al., 1998). One of 
the reasons for this is because prior research has ignored the importance of director 
capabilities such as human and social capital (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). By 
incorporating ideas about director capabilities into the model, we may have more success 
finding consistent links between the board and firm performance. Although director 
capabilities are important, one of the key features of the model presented in this study is 
the interactive nature of the capabilities of the board with some other components 
surrounding the board. The main effects of human and social capital are important, but it 
is equally important to understand how they moderate the effects of incentives and 
information processing demands. 
This model of board quality presented in Figure 1 is an aggregate of the quality of 
the individual directors. The decision to aggregate the individual attributes of directors to 
the board level was done because in order to fully understand board effectiveness, we 
must examine the ultimate outcome of effectiveness, firm-level performance. Therefore, 
in this dissertation, the unit of analysis is the firm. Consequently, I must examine the 
board as a single unit. It is reasonable to assume that greater levels of director experience 
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and knowledge should improve board functioning. Theissue of aggregation is discussed 
more fully in the methods section. 
DIVERSITY  
One question that inevitably arises when examining groups of individuals is that 
of the effects of diversity. I am not hypothesizing about the specific effects of board 
diversity on firm performance for a number of reasons. First, while evidence from other 
settings (such as TMTs) has found significant but mixed results (see Williams & 
O'Reilly, 1998 for a review of the diversity literature), the overall empirical effect of 
diversity on board functioning is much more limited (Alexander, Fennell, & Halpern, 
1993; Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994; Kosnik, 1990). Therefore, I would expect to 
find either null results or very small effects of diversity. In addition, the main argument 
for the benefits of diversity on a board is that a bo rd needs to be filled with people with 
a wide range of functional backgrounds in order to make the best decisions (Charan, 
1998). Much of this effect of diversity comes from the assumption that a diverse group 
would have access to unique knowledge (Williams & O'Reilly, 1998), which will be 
captured in my social capital construct.  
The context of boards also provides some evidence that diversity may be less of a 
factor than previously expected. As mentioned above, empirical evidence on diversity in 
the context of boards is limited (Alexander et al.,1993; Goodstein et al., 1994; Kosnik, 
1990). One reason for this may be that boards may function more as individuals 
interacting with management than as a group decision-making unit (Westphal, 1999). 
Westphal’s discussions and surveys with directors fund that many boards have a model 
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they operate under where the main impact of the board comes from providing advice on 
strategic decision-making and that this advice generally occurs from the CEO soliciting 
information from individual directors outside of board meetings (1999). Therefore, the 
effects of diversity are likely to be small since th  impact of functioning as a group entity 
is lessened. . So while I acknowledge that it is important for a board to have access to 
diverse information, and that diversity may have a small effect, my focus is on the 
capabilities of directors that I believe should have the most explanatory power. However, 
in order to rule out alternative explanations, I do plan on controlling for diversity. 
MONITORING AND ADVISING  
The theory presented in this section argues that bords of directors filled with 
more qualified directors should lead to higher firm performance. The overall reasoning is 
that human and social capitals contribute to both directors’ ability to monitor and to their 
ability to provide advice (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Both monitoring and advice-giving 
are important roles of directors and each type of action should increase firm performance. 
Monitoring involves exercising oversight over the choices that top management makes in 
the running of the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), usually through aligning executive 
interests (Bhagat, Brickley, & Lease, 1985), direct ratification of decisions (Baysinger & 
Hoskisson, 1990), and executive dismissal (Mizruchi, 1983). In contrast, participating in 
strategic decision making involves providing advice and counsel on strategic issues to 
executives and participating in the decision-making process about how to effectively 
manage the firm (Westphal, 1999).  
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The importance of monitoring by directors is driven by ideas from agency theory 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency theory perspectivs on corporate governance are 
concerned with the potential problems that can arise because of the separation of 
ownership and control in the modern firm (Berle & Means, 1932). In the modern firm, 
shareholders delegate “decision management” to top executives and rely on directors to 
exercise “decision control” over these top executives to protect their interests (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). Directors monitor executives to protect shareholders from the risk of 
moral hazard that can arise when the interests of an agent are not perfectly aligned with 
the interests of the principal. 
Advice-giving by the board is also very important. Advice and counsel 
interactions between directors and top managers allow managers to draw upon 
knowledge and information that can be useful when making strategic decisions (Johnson, 
Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). Advice from outside directors may 
also help managers see new strategic opportunities (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992). Consider 
this perspective on the importance of the board providing advice, given by an institutional 
investor during a personal interview with the author:  
Corporations need to realize that a good board can be one their most valuable 
resources. The board should do more than just approve the decisions of 
management and make minor changes. The board should be involved with 
management and should be participating in strategic decision-making. They 
should be helping to shape the direction of the firm. Boards need to be involved at 
a high level of strategic leadership. They need to be consulting with management, 
not just watching over them. 
 
As the paragraphs above demonstrate, in developing a model of board 
effectiveness, it is important to consider factors that should contribute to director’s 
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capabilities to both monitor and provide advice (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). In fact, 
research has found that greater director involvement in advice-giving and monitoring 
may each contribute to increased firm performance (Westphal, 1999). Therefore, a 
comprehensive model of an effective board must consider directors abilities to contribute 
to both types of actions. Secondly, at a conceptual level both tasks require outside 
directors to be able to understand the complexities and issues of the focal firm along with 
the actions of the officers of the focal firm. In order to monitor executive action, a 
director must understand the firm, its environment, and the actions undertaken by the 
executives. Effective advice-giving may require less firm-specific understanding than 
monitoring, but it still requires the ability to understand broad strategic issues and their 
impact on the firm. The model developed in this study argues that boards with more 
qualified directors should be better able to perform these duties and help their firms 
achieve higher levels of performance.  
DIRECTOR INCENTIVES AND ACTION  
Any discussion or model of director effectiveness must consider the issue of 
motivation. It is clear that in order to effectively monitor executive action or to provide 
advice and counsel on strategic issues, a director must choose to do so. A company’s 
board may be filled with skilled and qualified directors, but if they do not take interest in 
their duties and actually attempt to monitor or provide advice, then the board’s ability 
will not directly lead to positive firm outcomes. Therefore, in order to understand board 
effectiveness, we must consider what motivates directo s. 
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What factors might influence director motivation? Research from an agency 
perspective provides a couple of answers. Early work from this perspective argued that 
directors may be motivated to properly fulfill their duties because they have a desire to 
maintain a reputation as a good director (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hermalin & Weisbach, 
1991; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988) or because they are legally obligated to do so 
(Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). For example, Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that there 
is a market for directors and that therefore outside directors would have an incentive to 
actively monitor in order to enhance their reputation as a director and therefore improve 
their chances of receiving multiple board appointments. There is some research evidence 
that broadly supports this idea of a market for directors (Srinivasan, 2004; Zajac & 
Westphal, 1996).  
Agency theory also suggests that financial incentivs may be a strong motivating 
factor (Bhagat et al., 1985). Most research on corporate governance from an agency 
perspective has focused on how incentives may be used a  a tool to align the interests of 
management and shareholders (Boyd, 1994; Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985). However, the 
general agency problem may also apply to directors and shareholders. Directors are 
appointed as agents of the shareholders to act in their behalf to monitor and advise a 
separate group of agents, managers. However, as the literature shows, there is no 
guarantee that the interests of directors are perfectly aligned with those of shareholders 
(Mace, 1986). Some directors may have little or no desire to actively take a role 
monitoring executives or using their time to provide advice. This is where incentives may 
play a key role. Just as with executives, proper director incentives may align director’s 
interests with those of shareholders. Incentive contracting is the “first-best” solution to 
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the agency problem, because it eliminates the gap between the interests of the two parties 
(Beatty & Zajac, 1994).  
There are a number of ways that director compensation may lead to greater 
director effort. Directors are usually executives of other large companies. If a director is 
properly compensated, he/she will be more likely to put forth the necessary effort to 
fulfill his/her duties effectively. For public companies a certain level of compensation 
may be necessary before directors will feel any duty towards the company and its 
shareholders. For example, a director may feel thata certain level of compensation 
indicates a respect for their time and expertise. This idea was articulated by one of the 
directors to whom I spoke. He said: 
 There is a realization by companies that directors have to spend more real time to 
do their job. Directors now need to spend more time outside of meetings to 
prepare. Consequently, meeting fees are starting to rise. It is getting to be that if 
you are a director for a decent sized company then t  pay is a lot of money, 
especially in the eyes of people who don’t make a lot. However, this is necessary. 
You have to pay qualified directors what they are worth. In my situation, if I am 
offered a directorship that only pays $25,000 a year, it is very easy to turn that 
down. That is not very much money for me. Director mpensation needs to be at 
a market rate… New directors expect to be compensatd for their time. 
 
In addition, contingent pay may help motivate directors to action by putting a 
portion of their wealth at risk (Kosnik, 1990). For example, Yermack (2003) found that 
although the absolute level of compensation was much smaller than that paid to 
executives, the structure of director pay plans was very similar to the structure of 
executive compensation plans. In fact, it seems reaonable to suggest that contingent pay 
may work better for directors than it does for managers. With managers, one of the 
dangers of contingent pay is that high levels may cause managers to become overly risk 
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averse (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Zajac & Westphal, 1994). This danger is less likely for 
directors, because directors will likely have less of their overall compensation tied to the 
focal firm.  
  Finally, overall stock ownership in the firm may cause the director to feel invested 
in the firm’s outcomes. A minimum level of stock ownership by directors may help 
investors because it will ensure that directors have some “skin in the game” (Felton & 
Watson, 2002). When a director is also a partial owner of the firm, they will identify with 
the firm, and they will be invested in seeing the firm do well (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). 
In fact many boards seem aware of this fact and either make large awards to new 
directors, or they require new directors to buy a certain mass of stock when they join the 
board (Yermack, 2003). This quote from a director illustrates the value of stock options 
and stock ownership:  
Directors should own an amount of stock that is meaningful to them . . . They 
need to own this meaningful amount either by being granted options, or by 
purchasing it when they are first appointed. Ideally, director compensation should 
be about ½ cash and about ½ stock. The reason for this is that because of current 
tax laws a compensation structure like this really means that a director is working 
for essentially $0 unless the value of the company increases. This is great for 
shareholders. I used to be a director of a private company that did not have stock 
to grant me and so I was paid only in cash. I want to tell you that I think and act 
very differently for those companies in which I have a stake than I did as a 
director for that company.  
 
This leads to the following hypotheses: 
 
General Hypothesis 1: The greater the level of incentiv s provided to a 
company’s board, the higher the firm’s subsequent prformance. 
H1a: The greater the average level of total compensation provided to a 
company’s board, the higher the firm’s subsequent prformance. 
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H1b: The greater the average level of contingent compensation provided to a 
company’s board, the higher the firm’s subsequent prformance. 
H1c: The greater the level of firm ownership among directors, the higher the 
firm’s subsequent performance. 
HUMAN CAPITAL OF DIRECTORS 
One factor that may influence the ability of directors to contribute effectively to 
their duties is the level of the directors’ human cpital. The concept of human capital has 
been around for some time, but the first major theoretical treatment of the subject was 
done by Becker (1962). Becker was initially interested in how education was related to 
future earnings of individuals. However, while studying that problem he developed a 
more general theory of human capital. Specifically, he defined human capital as resources 
that are embedded within people (Becker, 1962). He argued that individuals make 
choices to invest in productivity-enhancing activities, and that these investments result in 
human capital. Some work uses the term human capital interchangeably with the terms 
knowledge, skill, or experience (Harris & Helfat, 1997), but according to Becker’s 
original definition it encompasses all of those things.  
Differences in intelligence or ability may result from inherent individual 
differences, but human capital is always viewed as a result of individual choices, like 
investment in education or experience (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989). This makes it a 
useful concept for study and research because it is something that both individuals and 
firms can be aware of and can influence. Research on uman capital originated in the 
economics literature and has been primarily used to predict an individual’s wages or job 
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mobility (Antel, 1986; Brown, 1976; Eriksson, 1991; Mincer, 1997). However, the 
concept of human capital has also been used within e management literature 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; Harris & Helfat, 1997).  
Much of the literature in both economics and management that uses the notion of 
human capital does so in a very perfunctory way (Brown, 1976; Galunic & Anderson, 
2000; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Mincer, 1997; Pennings, Lee, & van Witteloostuijn, 
1998). The idea of human capital is so intuitively appealing that it has not been really 
examined. For example, many studies that hypothesize about human capital simply state 
that it is valuable and then quickly move to measurement issues. However, before making 
predictions about why human capital may be valuable to the board, it is important to 
really understand what human capital is and where it comes from. 
Going back to Becker (1962), we see that he viewed human capital as the result of 
human specific investments. Much as an individual cn take money and make 
investments that result in stocks of financial capital, Becker argued that individuals make 
choices about investments in their time that can result in stocks of human capital. The 
idea is that individuals make choices about which productivity-enhancing activities to 
pursue in order to maximize future income and psychic benefit (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, 
& Woo, 1997). The result of these choices and time-inv stments is human capital. 
Human capital accrues through the application of time and energy devoted to learning 
through education or experience. This stock of capital can then be used in subsequent 
situations. Initially this theory was applied to wage differences and job mobility. The 
argument is that measurable differences in human capital (such as experience and 
education) are visible to employers a priori, and result in higher productivity ex post, and 
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that therefore employees with these stocks of resources should be able to extract higher 
wages and have greater job mobility.  
While human capital is not a direct measure of ability, it may be used as an 
appropriate proxy because it is correlated both with ability and with the outcomes of 
ability (Becker, 1962; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). This notion has been broadly supported 
in the economics literature (Antel, 1986; Brown, 1976). Within the management 
literature, human capital has also been used to predict higher compensation for 
individuals, especially CEOs and other top executives (Carpenter & Wade, 2002; 
Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990; Harris & Helfat, 1997; 
Weiss, 1995). One of the common themes in both the management and economics 
literature has been that human capital is often used to predict individual level outcomes. 
However, in the management literature there has also been extensive use of 
human capital explanations of firm-level outcomes. For example, human capital 
explanations have been used to predict greater succe s of entrepreneurial ventures 
(Bruderl, Preisendorfer, & Ziegler, 1992), and greater performance in service-oriented 
firms (Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, & Kochar, 2001). In addition, executive characteristics 
such as education, experience and other skills havebeen shown to predict higher firm 
performance in a number of settings (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1996; Huselid, 1995). This line of research provides strong support for the idea that 
human capital may have important effects on firm-leve  outcomes such as performance. 
For example, a recent study found that the stock market reacted strongly to the deaths of 
CEOs who had high pay premiums, which the study viewed as proxies for high levels of 
human capital (Combs & Skill, 2003).  
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Another perspective in strategy also provides some indirect support for the idea 
that human capital may be important for firm-level outcomes. The resource-based view 
argues that firm-specific assets and capabilities may lead to greater organizational 
performance (Barney, 1991). Managerial skill may be on  such important resource that 
fits the framework of being valuable, rare, and difficult to imitate (Castanias & Helfat, 
1991; Pennings et al., 1998). For instance, US multinational firms whose CEOs had 
human capital in the form of international assignmet xperience had higher firm 
performance (Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregersen, 2001). 
Taken together, these perspectives provide evidence that human capital may be 
important to firm-level outcomes. Therefore, it is reasonable to assert that human capital 
at the board level may contribute to board effectiveness. As noted above, the purpose of a 
board is to exercise decision control over management (Fama & Jensen, 1983) as well as 
to provide advice and counsel (Westphal, 1999). Both of these tasks will be improved by 
increased levels of human capital on the board.  
The modern corporation is often very large and complex. For example, General 
Electric had over $130 billion dollars in revenue in 2002 from hundreds of products 
distributed across at least 13 major divisions along with numerous subsidiaries. This size 
and complexity make it difficult for directors to monitor executives because it is hard for 
them to understand everything about the firm. This size and complexity also make it 
more difficult to provide meaningful advice. Directors with greater experience, 
education, and other valuable skills will be better able to effectively contribute to the firm 
than directors without these types of experiences. Human capital may therefore be a 
reasonable component of the ability of a director (B uderl et al., 1992; Hillman & 
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Dalziel, 2003). For example, a common task of boards is to oversee and/or approve 
acquisition decisions. Acquisitions are complex decisions and can be difficult to 
implement correctly (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Zajac & Bazerman, 1991). Directors 
with relevant prior experience in similar settings should be better able to evaluate the 
potential value of any acquisition targets than directors who have no experience dealing 
with acquisitions. It is also clear from practitioner oriented books and articles that more 
experienced and skilled directors are perceived to be valuable (Charan, 1998; Finkelstein 
& Mooney, 2003).  
This idea about the value of human capital was alsosupported in my discussions 
with directors and institutional investors. For instance, an institutional investor said:  
… (A director) needs to have a broad set of experiences and skills in order to 
contribute across a broad range. Many board members have experience in only 
one particular domain, like accounting, and that narrow experience influences 
their thinking and their ability to contribute. For example, having such a narrow 
experience makes everything they look at seem like an accounting issue. It is 
important to have a broad range of experience becaus  directors are required to 
make decisions about a wide range of factors. 
 
…Remember, directors are always at an informational disadvantage in 
comparison with management. An effective director overcomes this by being 
persistent and using their broad experience base to really understand the issues 
facing the company. 
 
Another director told me:  
An effective director is someone who is informed an conversant with the 
company’s business. A good director is able to look at the nitty-gritty details like 
the committee work, but is still able to see at the higher levels. They are able to 
ask the big questions. Is the company competing in its market? Is the company 
positioned well in its industry? Why or why not? 
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What these quotes really illustrate is the difficulty and complexity of contributing 
in a meaningful way to the strategy and governance of large public firms. In order to do 
this effectively, boards need to be filled with directors that have high levels of human 
capital. 
In order to understand how human capital may create v lue, it is important to 
consider the different types of human capital. Human c pital has been classified as either 
general or specific (Bruderl et al., 1992; Harris & Helfat, 1997). General human capital is 
a kind of skill or experience that is valuable across settings. Education is often used as an 
attribute associated with general human capital (Brude l et al., 1992) because it is 
assumed that the benefits of education involve not o ly the specific information learned, 
but the skills associated with learning across situations. Thus a bachelor’s degree is seen 
as more valuable than a high-school diploma not just for the specific information learned, 
but because of the perceived improvement in the individual’s overall ability to learn. 
Specific human capital on the other hand is tied to a specific function or location and is 
developed through direct experience rather than more general learning. Both types of 
human capital will be helpful for directors trying to monitor or provide advice to 
executives. I will now talk briefly about a few types of human capital and how they might 
be linked to more effective boards and increased firm performance. 
Education Level 
Education level is a very common indicator of human c pital (Bantel & Jackson, 
1989; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Pennings et al., 1998; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). The 
reason that increased formal education is a useful indicator of human capital is because it 
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helps individuals develop more effective ways of learning and processing information. 
Formal education promotes meaningful versus rote learning of information (Singley & 
Anderson, 1989). Formal education also shapes individual’s mental models, and teaches 
people cognitive short-cuts (Hitt & Tyler, 1991). Learning theory suggests that teaching 
people to generate analogies allows individuals to draw principles and abstract structures 
out of specific situations (Loewenstein, Thompson, & Gentner, 1999). Learning theory 
also suggests that the process of generating analogies does not always happen 
automatically and is something that can be learned (Loewenstein et al., 1999). One of the 
purposes of most formal education programs is to help students learn general principles 
and theories that they can apply to multiple problems. For instance, most professional 
programs like law and business require students not o ly to learn information, but also to 
apply the principles gleaned from that knowledge across different cases and examples. 
The ability to generate abstract principles from specific situations is one of the 
key differences between a novice and an expert (Chi, Glaser, & Rees, 1982; Singley & 
Anderson, 1989). Research has shown that the differenc  between an expert and a novice 
is non-trivial and is especially important in situations where the problems are complex 
(Loewenstein et al., 1999; Singley & Anderson, 1989). Experts solve problems more 
quickly and with fewer errors than novices (Chi et al., 1982). While this aspect of 
“expertness” is clearly beneficial, the main benefit o  being an expert appears to come 
from the way experts organize knowledge and approach complex problems. Experts start 
by approaching problems from a qualitative perspectiv  (Chi et al., 1982). Experts 
organize and structure knowledge in a more systematic and usable way. This is contrasted 
with novices who are limited in the “architecture of their cognitive systems or processing 
27 
capabilities” (Chi et al., 1982: 71). Because of this limitation, novices have an inability to 
use powerful search heuristics and an inability to detect important cues in the problem 
which leads to suboptimal outcomes. Experts make better use of the information 
available to them by avoiding the superficial features of problems and by focusing on 
deep, functional relationships between this problem and other similar problems (Chi et 
al., 1982). 
Research in organizations has also argued for the ben fits of increased levels of 
formal education for reasons similar to those articulated above. Top management team 
researchers have reasoned that individuals with higlevels of education “are likely to 
engage in boundary spanning, tolerate ambiguity, and show an ability for ‘integrative 
complexity’” (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992: 99). Organization researchers have also 
proposed that high levels of education will give TM members a greater capacity for 
information processing and a better ability to distinguish among different stimuli 
(Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). These ideas are clearly similar to the notions of expertness 
in the learning literature. In addition, empirically these ideas have been supported as 
higher levels of TMT education have been associated with both greater firm innovation 
(Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981) and greater organizational change 
(Wiersema & Bantel, 1992).  
The types of learning and knowledge structures generated by increased formal 
education will be valuable for directors. Directors are required to understand large 
amounts of complex information quickly, and having knowledge structures that promote 
this will help them do their job more effectively. Directors with more education should be 
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better able to interpret and group the information presented to them. Therefore boards 
filled with directors with high levels of formal education should be more effective. 
Total Management Experience 
 
A director is expected to understand and evaluate the actions of top managers and 
how those actions will impact the firm. Consider this quote by a director:  
Basically, directors have to make the major decisions; they have to come to grips 
with the issue of where the company should be going. For example, should the 
company be borrowing a lot of money as a matter of policy and leveraging itself, 
as opposed to contracting and not leveraging itself? Should the company go into a 
new line of business? Those are decisions made at the board level, but there is a 
very fine line between what the board does and what the CEO does (Lorsch & 
MacIver, 1989: 66). 
 
What this quote illustrates is that the role of a director is increasingly more than 
just reading financial statements or setting compensation contracts. Executive and 
managerial work is very complex (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Lorsch & MacIver, 
1989; Mintzberg, 1975). In addition, managerial skill is complex, rare, and difficult to 
acquire (Castanias & Helfat, 1991; Pennings et al., 1998). Directors are involved with the 
firm at a high-level and prior managerial or executive experience should be valuable.  
One of the ways human capital is acquired is through experience (Harris & Helfat, 
1997). For instance, research has shown that experinc  with making certain types of 
decisions leads to better decision-making performance i  the future in similar situations 
(Taylor, 1975). In fact, much like education above, experience is another way someone 
can move from being a novice to being an expert (Chi et al., 1982). Experience allows the 
transfer of tacit knowledge (Singley & Anderson, 1989) that may be difficult to acquire 
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simply through education or reading. As tacit knowledge is acquired, individuals are 
better able to build knowledge structures that promote more powerful search heuristics 
(Chi et al., 1982). Experience also helps individuals see commonalities between 
situations and develop principle-centered knowledge structures (Loewenstein et al., 
1999). These knowledge structures enhance future problem solving by helping experts 
solve problems more quickly, and by facilitating individual ability to focus on relevant 
information cues (Singley & Anderson, 1989). 
By helping individuals become experts in managerial decision-making, prior 
managerial experience is directly related to greate expertise and skill (Pfeffer & Davis-
Blake, 1986). For example, one of the jobs of a board of directors is to choose new 
CEOs. Understanding the job of a CEO and who would make a good CEO will be 
difficult without top management experience. Therefo , boards filled with more 
experienced directors should be more effective at ev luating the actions of managers and 
providing strategic advice.  
Home Company Performance 
 
While direct management experience should help a director build human capital, 
another indicator should be the level of success experienced by directors. Although firm 
performance is affected by numerous factors, studies have shown that top executives’ 
characteristics and decisions also influence firm performance (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1996; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Directors who come from companies with high levels 
of performance should be better able to evaluate the actions of the focal firm’s 
management. If superior management skills are rare and difficult to acquire (Castanias & 
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Helfat, 1991), then these skills should lead to higher firm performance. Directors from 
high performing firms are more likely to give advice that is better and more relevant than 
directors who come from low-performing firms. As argued above, it should be important 
to have directors that have prior management experience. Performance of their home 
companies may in some way indicate the quality of that experience.1  
Firm Tenure 
 
Firm tenure is a proxy for firm-specific human capit l (Buchholtz, Ribbens, & 
Houle, 2003). As mentioned above, modern corporations are very large and tremendously 
complex. It is difficult to truly understand such complex organizations. The longer a 
director has served on the board of a firm, the more that director will know about the 
company and the greater will be that director’s expertise. A board that is filled with high 
tenure directors should be better able to give advice and should be better able to monitor 
executive action. One example where firm-specific expertise is crucial is the decision to 
make an acquisition. Typically, the value of an acquisition is based on proposed 
synergies between the target firm and the acquirer that will enhance revenue and make up 
for any premium paid. However, synergies are ambiguous and difficult to quantify, and 
must be based on very specific information about the focal firm. A director with greater 
levels of firm-specific knowledge will be better able to evaluate the wisdom of such a 
decision.  
                                                
1 Some theoretical perspectives argue that it is more useful to have experienced a variance in outcomes 
rather than generally positive outcomes (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002). However, my focus theoretically 
is on proxies for ability (where generally more is better).  
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It must be noted that in studies of top managers, firm tenure often has a negative 
effect on firm performance (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 
1996; Miller & Shamsie, 2001; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). This relationship is a result of 
over-commitment by top managers to prior decisions a d the current status quo of the 
firm. Managers become rigid in their decision-making and firm performance suffers. I do 
not expect this same relationship to be true for director tenure. Directors are less 
vulnerable to these processes due to the different nature of director tenure.  
Directors spend much less time with a firm than executives. They come in for 
periodic meetings, approve strategic decisions, offer advice, and provide useful counsel. 
Directors do not stake their personal reputations o strategic decisions in the same way 
top managers do, and are therefore less likely to be prone to the process of over-
commitment to these decisions. Consequently, in this situation, greater levels of direct 
experience with the firm should be beneficial because it should give directors the needed 
time to overcome the significant informational challenges associated with being an 
effective director. Executives and directors need to develop firm-specific knowledge to 
guide decision making (Thomas, Clark, & Gioia, 1993), and the only way to gain such 
knowledge is through prior experience with the firm. For example, consider this quote 
about a proposal to limit director terms of service: “I worry a little about its proposal that 
board terms be limited to six years, because it’s hard to make a contribution as a good 
director in any less time than that (Knowledge at Wharton, 2003b).” Also, information 
coming in to the firm is ambiguous in nature and needs to be interpreted through the lens 
of the firm (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Thomas et al., 1993). The only way directors will 
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have the necessary insight to be able to interpret this information correctly is if they are 
familiar with the firm and how it operates.  
Strategic Relatedness 
 
Prior experience with strategically similar companies could have benefits for two 
main reasons. The first reason they might have benefits is not a human capital 
explanation. Serving on the boards of strategically related companies may provide 
directors with access to useful information. As Useem noted, “Direct involvement in 
other companies’ affairs replaces an awful lot of reading . . . it’s a hell of a tool for top 
management education” (1982: 209-210). Second, directors rely on schema driven 
knowledge structures for decision-making, and these schema are heavily influenced by 
directors’ prior experience (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). Experience in strategically 
similar companies should help build knowledge structures that are relevant to the types of 
problems likely to be confronted by the focal firm (Haunschild, 1993; Useem, 1982). 
These relevant and useful knowledge structures are a form of human capital. While, as I 
will argue below, I do believe access to useful information should be valuable for 
directors, I believe that the value of strategic relatedness is primarily related to the 
second, human capital explanation. The effect of the knowledge structure created should 
be more important than the value derived through access to contacts (Useem, 1982). It is 
largely the value of the experience that is useful. This is because direct experience with 
strategically similar problems and issues is more lik ly to be important at the focal firm 
(Haunschild, 1993). Consider for instance the issue of international expansion. Directors 
with experience in companies that have expanded intrna ionally should be better able to 
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help the firm understand the specific types of problems and situations they might face. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that recent practitioner oriented articles have also argued 
that it is important to have board members with strategically relevant experience (Charan, 
1998; Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003).  
 
Therefore I propose the following: 
 
General Hypothesis 2: The greater the level of human c pital on a company’s 
board, the higher the firm’s subsequent performance. 
H2a: The greater the total level of education on a company’s board, the higher 
the firm’s subsequent performance. 
H2b: The greater the level of total management experience on a company’s 
board, the higher the firm’s subsequent performance. 
H2c: The greater the average performance of directors’ home companies, the 
higher the firm’s subsequent performance. 
H2d: The greater the average firm tenure of a company’s board, the higher the 
firm’s subsequent performance. 
H2e: The greater the average strategic relatedness of directors’ home companies, 
the higher the firm’s subsequent performance. 
SOCIAL CAPITAL OF DIRECTORS  
Social capital is another factor that may contribute to the ability of directors to 
provide quality monitoring and advice. Unlike human capital, with its roots in economic 
theory and its lengthy history, social capital is a much more recent idea with roots in 
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literature from divergent social science disciplines (Adler & Kwon, 2002). The basic 
concept of social capital is that social ties arising from both work and non-work relations 
can be used for many different purposes. This leads to the notion that social structure has 
value that is appropriable (Coleman, 1988). 
Adler and Kwon (2002) highlight a number of similarities between social capital 
and other forms of capital like human and financial pital. First, like other forms of 
capital, social capital is an asset that resources (e.g. time, attention) can be directed 
towards in the hope of future benefits. Individuals can devote effort to maintaining or 
building their networks in order to enhance future opportunities. Second, although it may 
be less liquid than other forms of capital, social pital is both appropriable (Coleman, 
1988) and convertible (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Third, social capital can be a substitute 
and/or complement to other assets. For example, social capital caused by trust may 
reduce transaction costs (Uzzi, 1997). Fourth, social capital needs maintenance as do 
physical and human capital. Fifth, some forms of social capital are “collective goods” 
like clean air or other public resources and are not the private property of those who 
benefit from them (Coleman, 1988).  
However, while social capital is similar to other fo ms of capital, it also has some 
unique properties. First, unlike most other assets, social capital arises not from actors 
directly, but from the relationships between actors (Coleman, 1988). Second, unlike most 
other types of capital, the investments that lead to social capital are very difficult, if not 
impossible, to measure in a quantifiable way (Adler & Kwon, 2002).  
It must be acknowledged that social capital and human capital are related and 
even complementary (Coleman, 1990). However, they ar  conceptually distinct and the 
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investments needed to create social capital are fundamentally different from the 
investments needed to create human capital (Burt, 1997). As mentioned above in the 
discussion on strategic relatedness, social capital may provide access to unique sources of 
information that cause specialized knowledge structures to develop resulting in greater 
human capital. In addition, high levels of social cpital may lead to networks filled with 
better contacts. However, the relationship between human and social capital, while 
interesting, is not the focus of this dissertation. I am interested in examining how the 
levels of human and social capital of a group of individuals at one point in time affect 
their ability to help the firm. Therefore, while I acknowledge the potential recursive 
relationship between human and social capital, I am not directly examining it in this 
study.  
Social capital can be viewed as the aspect of the social structure that creates value 
and facilitates action by individuals (Coleman, 1990). Social capital creates value 
because it may be transformed into other forms of capital like human capital (Coleman, 
1988) or physical capital (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Social capital has been empirically 
shown to have a number of valuable benefits (see Adl r & Kwon, 2002 for a summary). 
Here I am following Adler and Kwon’s definition of social capital: “Social capital is the 
goodwill available to individuals or groups. Its source lies in the structure and content of 
the actor’s social relations. Its effects flow from the information, influence, and solidarity 
it makes available to the actor” (2002: 23). I am also following recent approaches by 
considering the effects of both the structure and content of social ties (Adler & Kwon, 
2002; Seibert, Kraimer, & Liden, 2001). 
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The definition of social capital above provides three main benefits of social 
capital: information, influence, and solidarity. Solidarity is beneficial to groups or 
organizations in social networks with high closure, b cause it creates a strong set of 
shared norms and it leads to greater commitment and less monitoring (in this way it is 
similar to the benefits of trust) (Adler & Kwon, 2002). While there are clear theoretical 
and empirical arguments for the general benefits of solidarity, it is less clear how 
solidarity arising from social capital would positively influence board effectiveness. Also, 
indicators of solidarity would be difficult, if not impossible, to measure in this setting. 
Therefore, for the purpose of this study I will consider how information and influence 
arising from a board’s social capital may impact board effectiveness.  
The acquisition of information is costly. It requires attention, which is always in 
short supply. However, information can be obtained through social relations that are 
maintained for other purposes (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1990). Directors are embedded 
within networks of individuals that may provide differential access to valuable 
information (Granovetter, 1985). Directors with greater social capital through more board 
ties, or connections to prominent others will have better access to information. This will 
improve their ability to monitor executive action ad their ability to provide advice on 
strategic issues. Research has shown that social networks may give actors access to 
information that leads to greater innovation (Burt, 1987; Coleman, Katz, & Menzel, 
1966; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996; Rogers, 1995). Uzzi (1997) also found that 
social networks led to fine-grained information exchange, which is exactly the type of 
information that is likely to be valuable for directors. Directors are faced with complex 
issues and problems. For example, consider the process of an acquisition. Acquisitions 
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are very tricky to implement successfully, and directors that have strong social ties may 
have access to very specific information about what pitfalls to avoid when implementing 
an acquisition and will be able to provide this advice to the executives of the firm.  
Social capital may also provide a board with greater influence and power. The 
literature on power and social influence is extensive within the study of organizations 
(Belliveau, O'Reilly, & Wade, 1996; Boeker, 1992; Brass, 1992; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974). Social capital may give a board more power in its 
relationship with management and allow directors greater influence in decision-making 
(Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Zajac & Westphal, 1996). Social capital may also give a board 
power and influence in the eyes of external stakeholders (Burt, 1983; Cool & Henderson, 
1998; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002; Uzzi, 1999). Prominent board members may be able 
to influence governmental legislation so that it is more favorable to the corporation 
(Domhoff, 1983; Useem, 1982). In addition, boards filled with highly influential people 
may secure more favorable access to resources and capital (Domhoff, 1983; Uzzi, 1999). 
Also, boards filled with prestigious directors may help the firm’s decisions to be seen as 
more legitimate and acceptable to the market. Therefore, having a board filled with 
highly-connected, influential directors is likely to lead to improved firm performance. 
As I did with human capital, I will now briefly discuss a few specific types of 
social capital and how they might be linked to more eff ctive boards and increased firm 
performance. 
Total Board Ties 
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The number of interlocks a company has through its board should help the firm in 
two main ways. First, the number of ties a director has to other boards of directors should 
increase that director’s overall level of information diversity. Information is valuable, but 
is often difficult to acquire. The connections betwen corporate directorships create a real 
and viable social network through which information and influence may flow (Koenig & 
Gogel, 1981). Being highly connected may give directors access to information that leads 
to more innovative ideas for the focal firm (Powell t al., 1996; Rogers, 1995). For 
example, board interlocks have been shown to be a source of information about practices 
such as acquisitions (Haunschild, 1994). Highly connected directors may also be more 
able to get information that is unique or difficult to transfer (Uzzi, 1997). This 
information should be exceptionally valuable. When I asked directors about the 
importance of board ties, I got responses that echoed this idea. Following are two 
responses that exemplify this nicely:  
I think it is generally positive to have other board ppointments. You are usually 
on boards in different industries. This is useful because you learn a great deal. I 
believe that there is more to be learned outside of your own sandbox. You learn 
more by examining issues from a different perspectiv . 
 
One of the things that organizations suffer from is isolation. It is difficult to get 
information across organizational boundaries. Whatever you can do to improve 
those information flows will be beneficial. 
 
Another way total board ties should be helpful is because being highly connected 
gives a firm power and prestige. The number of directorships an individual has is a 
measure of director power because it allows a directo  to absorb uncertainty in the 
institutional environment (Finkelstein, 1992). Also, as we learn from the literature on 
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social networks, information itself is a source of power (Burt, 1992), and as argued 
above, connections should increase directors access to information. Directorships may be 
used to establish ties to important people in the business elite (Useem, 1982). These 
connections to many powerful others create a network of influence through which the 
director can try to benefit the firm (Useem, 1979).  
Total board ties are also an indicator of a firm’s structural position within the 
network of interlocked firms (centrality). Network position may also give a firm power 
and influence. There has been a tremendous amount of research that has focused on the 
influence of advantageous structural positions within networks (Brass & Burkhardt, 
1992; Burt, 1992; Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000; Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000). Previous 
research on board interlocks has shown that connectio s between firms because of 
interlocked directors can influence firm action (Davis, 1991; Gulati & Westphal, 1999; 
Haunschild, 1993). Firms that are more central in the network of interlocked firms should 
be better positioned to have access to relevant information and also to have high social 
status.  
Performance of Interlocked Companies 
 
When the companies that a director is connected with do well, that should 
increase his/her prestige and reputation (Fama, 1980; Finkelstein, 1992). It should also be 
an indicator, although indirectly, of that director’s access to useful or quality information. 
Being a director of a high performing company should a so indicate that the director 
understands effective board processes and is associted with companies that are making 
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good decisions. The more a director is exposed to these kinds of activities, the better he 
or she should be able to use that information in the focal firm. 
Social Club Membership 
 
Membership in prominent social clubs may also be a useful indicator of social 
capital. Literature on corporate elites argues thate most prominent corporate directors 
form an elite group in society that has a tremendous amount of power and influence 
(Zeitlin, 1974). Social clubs are a place where rich and prominent individuals meet and 
interact, and memberships in these prominent social clubs are difficult to acquire because 
part of the goal and allure of these clubs is their exclusivity. Members of the corporate 
elite meet and get to know one another through their m mberships in these exclusive 
clubs and thereby improve their status and prestige (Domhoff, 1970, 1983; Palmer & 
Barber, 2001). Obtaining an education at an elite university may be useful, but members 
of the corporate elite who belong to numerous social clubs are the most prominent and 
powerful members of the business community (Palmer & Barber, 2001; Zeitlin, Ewen, & 
Ratcliff, 1974). In fact, it has been proposed that members of social clubs may be the 
“inner group” of the corporate class (Useem, 1979, 1982; Zeitlin et al., 1974). 
Having prestigious directors who are members of these clubs should be useful to 
the firm. As I heard from one director:  
Social connections are very important. Companies have to manage more than just 
their business. Companies have to manage public relation and politics as well. A 
business is a part of the larger environment. It is important that companies have a 
presence with different aspects of the community. 
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Social club membership has been used in the past as an indicator of the 
status aspect of social capital (Belliveau et al., 1996). Having prestigious directors 
may help the firm gain access to financial resources in times of trouble (Domhoff, 
1983; Uzzi, 1999). In addition, high-status directors may be able to directly or 
indirectly influence legislation that affects the firm (Domhoff, 1983; Useem, 
1982). Social club membership may also be an additional place where information 
can diffuse through the social network. Firms filled with high status directors may 
also benefit from having increased legitimacy attached to their strategic decisions.  
 
Therefore I propose the following hypotheses: 
 
General Hypothesis 3: The greater the level of social apital on a company’s 
board, the higher the firm’s subsequent performance. 
H3a: The greater the total number of board ties of a company’s board, the higher 
the firm’s subsequent performance.  
H3b: The greater the average performance of companies with whom the directors 
share interlocks, the higher the firm’s subsequent performance. 
H3c: The greater the number of social club memberships of a company’s board, 
the higher the firm’s subsequent performance.  
INTERACTION BETWEEN HUMAN AND SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INCENTIVES  
 
Not only should human capital and social capital have  main effect on firm 
performance, but they should also magnify the effect of director incentives. Aligning the 
incentives of directors should have little impact on firm performance if the directors are 
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unskilled or unable to perform their duties effectively. In fact, research suggests that it is 
the combination of motivation and ability that leads to performance (Mitchell, 1997; Van 
Eerde & Thierry, 1996). As a board’s level of human and social capital rise, so does the 
value of providing proper incentives. Having directors who care about and are interested 
in the well-being of the firm will be most useful, when those directors are skilled and 
have access to valuable information. Castanias and Helfat (1991) argued that managers 
with high levels of skill will withhold effort if they do not receive pay premiums. This 
directly implies an interaction between human capital and incentives. Without adequate 
compensation, directors may do the same. In addition, Zald (1969) argued that incentives 
would influence a board’s motivation to use their pe sonal characteristics and resources 
for the firm’s benefit. This implies that human and social capital will amplify the value of 
having directors interests aligned with shareholders (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Therefore 
I propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4a: Human capital will strengthen the effect of incentives on firm 
performance. 
Hypothesis 4b: Social capital will strengthen the effect of incentives on firm 
performance. 
INFORMATION DEMANDS ON DIRECTORS 
 
While both human and social capital will enhance a director’s ability to fulfill his 
or her duties, we must also consider factors that will detract from that ability. One such 
factor is the information demand (Galbraith, 1974) placed on directors by their 
responsibilities outside the focal firm. A well established body of literature deals with the 
43 
cognitive limitations of individuals (Cyert & March, 1963; Dearborn & Simon, 1958; 
Schwenk, 1984; Tetlock, 2000). The rather axiomatic conclusion that follows from these 
works is that individuals are bounded in their ability to handle and process information 
(Cyert & March, 1963); consequently, people make decision errors (Schwenk, 1984; 
Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). If the ability to process large volumes of information 
varies (Dollinger, 1984; Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996), then it is important to think 
about whether information processing demands outside the focal firm will influence 
directors’ ability to monitor and provide advice within the focal firm. 
Why might information processing demands affect directors’ ability to act 
effectively and make good strategic decisions? Organizations are complex and are 
surrounded by multiple stimuli (Ocasio, 1995) that must be attended to in order to 
achieve success. Strategic decision making places high information processing demands 
on individuals (Corner, Kinicki, & Keats, 1994). Most directors are either executives or 
directors of other large companies. As the number and complexity of organizations that a 
director is a part of and responsible for increases, o does the demand on that director’s 
ability to process information. Because directors have a limited ability to process 
information, the more information they must attend to outside the firm, the less 
information they will be able to attend to within the firm. When directors are 
overwhelmed with information demands, they will not be able to productively monitor 
executive action or contribute meaningfully to strategic decision making. A quote by 
Carpenter and Westphal illustrates this point nicely: 
…(I)t has been repeatedly suggested that outside directors are often inadequately 
prepared to participate in board discussions becaus their time and attention are 
44 
divided and diluted by their other board appointments; serving on boards at 
multiple companies makes it difficult for them to gain an adequate understanding 
of the issues facing any one firm (2001). 
 
It is also important to consider the factors that might contribute to increased 
external information processing demands on directors. One issue that might affect the 
level of information processing is simply the number of directorships held. More 
directorships might hamper a director’s ability to focus on the focal firm. This idea that 
directors that are just too busy might not be as effective is widely held by directors. 
Consider the following quotes:  
If (directors) are already on 7 or 8 other boards, it i  unlikely that they will have 
the time necessary to be effective. In addition, if (directors) are the CEO of a large 
company and they sit on 3 or 4 boards that is also likely a problem. 
… (D)irectors just don’t have the time necessary to do a good job if they have too 
many board appointments. 
 
However, the empirical support for this idea is mixed and is based on studies that 
use a simple count of the number of directorships (Ferris, Jagannathan, & Pritchard, 
2003; Perry & Peyer, 2002). One possible reason for these mixed results is that all 
directorships are not equal in the level of information processing required. Firms have 
different levels of information complexity (Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996). Therefore, 
rather than simply considering the number of firms a director is associated with, I will 
instead focus on the complexity of those firms.  
Firm size and level of diversification should both contribute to the complexity of 
a firm and its subsequent information-processing demands (Henderson & Fredrickson, 
1996). As a firm increases in size, so does the scope and variety of the firm’s customers 
and suppliers. This will result in a need for more strategic initiatives. Also larger firms 
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are likely to have a larger range and heterogeneity of factors that need to be considered 
when making strategic decisions. This requires not o ly more information processing by 
management, but also a wider range of information to be processed.  
As a firm becomes involved in more businesses, the information load placed on 
executives and directors should increase (Chandler, 1962; Henderson & Fredrickson, 
1996). Regardless of the level of investment into any particular business, the more 
businesses a firm is involved in, the broader the range and complexity of information that 
must be dealt with in order to make strategic decisions (Thompson, 1967). The number of 
businesses is important separate from whether or not they are related or unrelated 
(Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996). For related diversifi , increases in the number of 
business still adds to the information-processing load because of the need to understand 
and manage interdependencies (Hill & Hoskisson, 1987; Jones & Hill, 1988). In 
unrelated diversifiers, increases in the number of business adds to the information load 
because of the need to maintain efficient internal c pital markets (Henderson & 
Fredrickson, 1996; Jones & Hill, 1988). In addition, i  recent years relatively few 
diversified companies treat their portfolio of businesses as an internal capital market. Top 
management is now typically expected to engage in some non-financial control of 
divisions in their portfolio, whether related or not. Consequently, the number of unique 
businesses should directly relate to the overall information processing load of a top 
manager. Therefore, the larger and more diverse the ot r firms a director is associated 
with, the less capacity a director will have for his or her duties in the focal firm. This 
leads to the following hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 5: The greater the level of information-processing demanded of a 
company’s board, the lower the firm’s subsequent performance.  
H5a: The greater the average size of directors’ home companies, the lower the 
firm’s subsequent performance.  
H5b: The greater the average number of businesses that director’s home 
companies participate in, the lower the firm’s subsequent performance.  
H5c: The greater the average size of firms of director’s board appointments, the 
lower the focal firm’s subsequent performance. 
H5d: The greater the average number of businesses that director’s board 
appointments participate in, the lower the firm’s sub equent performance.  
INTERACTION BETWEEN HUMAN AND SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INFORMATION 
PROCESSING DEMANDS 
 
As with the other pieces of the model, it is important to consider how human and 
social capital will interact with information processing demands. While I expect 
information processing demands to have a negative main effect on firm performance as 
argued above, I also expect that effect to be attenuat d by the level of human and social 
capital of the board. Human and social capital willbe most necessary when information 
demands are high. Some of the benefits of human capital described above are related to 
having more efficient knowledge structures and a greater ability to effectively make 
decisions. This clearly implies that human capital will be most valuable, when there are 
also high information-processing requirements. A greater ability to sort through and 
process complex information will be most valuable when information demands are high. 
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Expert directors should be better able to know which information is relevant, and which 
information they can discard. In addition, social cpital will be most valuable under 
conditions of high information demands. One of the benefits of social networks is access 
to information that helps reduce individual’s direct information processing load. Network 
ties help individuals know which information is timely and relevant (Beckman & 
Haunschild, 2002; Burt, 2000; Uzzi, 1999). This information is especially relevant under 
conditions of complexity. Therefore, I would expect human and social capital to be most 
useful when information-processing demands are high. This leads to the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 6a: Human capital will positively moderat  the negative relationship 
between information processing demands and firm performance.  
Hypothesis 6b: Social capital will positively moderate the negative relationship 
between information processing demands and firm performance.  
Research Methodology 
PRELIMINARY INTERVIEWS  
During the development of this study, I conducted preliminary interviews with 
seven board members and also with one institutional investor. The purpose of these 
interviews was to inform the theoretical ideas of this study and to see whether these ideas 
were present in the minds and thoughts of practicing directors. These discussions helped 
provide valuable insight while I was shaping my hypotheses. I conducted the interviews 
in a semi-structured format. I asked the individuals questions regarding their thoughts 
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regarding director effectiveness and current trends and developments in the corporate 
governance landscape. The directors were told that I was studying board effectiveness, 
and that I was looking for insight from practicing directors. After each interview I 
transcribed my written notes. I have used quotes from these interviews throughout the 
text to provide illustration and richness to the thoretical discussion. 
SAMPLE AND DATA COLLECTION  
The theory generated in this dissertation is interest d in the board of directors of 
large public companies, and the issues arising in the effective governance of those 
companies. Therefore, in order to test these hypotheses I will study large public 
companies. I have chosen to study large firms for several reasons. First, most of the 
theorizing and empirical research regarding boards of directors has been conducted on 
large. By conducting this study using a similar sample, I enhance the comparability of my 
findings with those of prior research. In this study I argue that some of the reason for the 
weak results of prior studies of board independence is due to the failure to include 
director capabilities into the model. Therefore it was important to test my hypotheses in a 
setting similar to prior studies of board independence. Second, archival data on director 
characteristics is only available on mid-to large sized firms. Consequently, the 
conclusions of this study are only applicable to large firms. I use “intertypical” sampling 
in this study, by selecting firms across multiple industries rather than examining a group 
of firms within a single industry (Kimberly, 1976). Intertypical sampling allows my 
results to be more generalizable across different firms and industries. This study uses 
archival data on firms in the Fortune 1000. The Fortune 1000 is a yearly list of the largest 
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1000 firms in the US economy. I selected a random sa ple of 650 of the firms that were 
members of the Fortune 1000.  
In order to test the hypotheses presented in this sudy, I collected archival data on 
each firm selected above over four years. My independent variables were measured from 
2001-2004 and my dependent variables were measured from 2002-20052.  
The archival data for this study was collected from a number of sources. Data on 
firm sales and performance was collected from COMPUSTAT. Data on firm 
diversification was collected from the COMPUSTAT segment database. Information on 
compensation both as executives and directors was collected from the COMPUSTAT 
EXECUCOMP database, from firm proxy statements, and from the Corporate Library. 
Information on director attributes was collected from the Corporate Library, the Who’s 
Who Directory of Corporate America, Standard and Poor’s Register of Corporations, 
Directors and Executives, and company proxy statements. Information on firm’s foreign 
locations was collected from the Directory of Corporate Affiliations. 
MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES  
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable of this study is firm performance. I plan to measure firm 
performance in two ways. The first measure is return on equity (ROE) which is an 
accounting measure of performance. Return on equity reflects both the operating 
efficiency of the firm as well as the financing choices of the firm. Therefore, in many 
                                                
2 Note: the performance data is not yet available for 2005, Compustat and WRDS usually update their 
performance data in June or July every year to include data from the prior year. As soon as the 2005 data is 
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cases ROE may present a biased measure of overall firm performance because two firms 
with equal operating performance would have different ROEs based on their level of 
debt. However, when measuring the performance of the irm as affected by the board, it 
is important to understand that the board is concerned with total firm performance, and so 
a performance measure that incorporates both operating efficiency and financing is 
appropriate. There are other accounting measures of performance such as return on assets 
(ROA). I ran models using ROA as the dependent variable as well as a number of 
different accounting based measures with similar results. The second measure is market-
to-book value of equity which is a market-based measure of performance. Market-to-book 
value measures how effectively a firm is creating value for shareholders by comparing 
the market value of the firm with the cost of capitl hat has been contributed by 
shareholders (Westphal, 1999). I also ran models using total stock returns as an 
alternative market-based measure of performance and h d similar results. As mentioned 
earlier, I plan to measure performance one year after all independent variables are 
measured3.  
Independent Variables 
Incentive Measures:  
Director compensation plans usually include a fixed y arly retainer and smaller 
additional fees for things such as meeting attendance. However, since the late 1980s 
firms have usually paid the annual retainer partly in equity using either direct stock grants 
                                                                                                                                      
available I will gather it and re-run my analyses to include the extra year. Consequently, the models 
presented here test the data on a 3-year panel.) 
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or stock options (Yermack, 2003). However, company disclosures about the nature of the 
stock and stock option grants to directors are usually much briefer than similar 
discussions about executive pay plans (Yermack, 2003). What this means is that I had to 
estimate some of the terms of the stock awards, such as the date, vesting restrictions, etc. 
In all cases I followed the procedure outlined by Yermack (2003). I also coded a dummy 
variable to indicate cases where I had to make an estimation. I subsequently included this 
dummy variable in all of the models to control for any bias introduced due to any 
estimation of data.  
Average total director compensation was measured as the total annual 
compensation package of a director including annual ret iner, meeting fees, and stock 
option grants.  
Percentage of contingent compensation was measured as the proportion of total 
director compensation granted in long-term or contingent forms such as stock options 
(Zajac & Westphal, 1994). This measure was then averaged across all of the directors on 
the board. For stock options, I used the Black-Scholes method of valuation (Zajac & 
Westphal, 1994). The Black-Scholes method is the most widely used, and prior research 
has shown that it is highly correlated with the SEC valuation method and usually gives 
similar results when used in analysis (Sanders, 2001).  
Level of firm ownership by directors was measured as the percentage of company 
stock owned by the directors of the firm (Sanders & Boivie, 2004). This measure was 
then divided by the number of total directors on the board to get the average level of 
                                                                                                                                      
3 Because I currently have only 3 years of data, running longer lags would result in losing a large portion of 
the sample size. However, once the data for 2005 is available, I will also re-run my analyses using two-year 
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ownership by each outside director. This also controls for those directors who are also 
blockholders of the firm. 
Human and Social Capital Measures 
I measured five indicators of human capital and three indicators of social capital. 
All of the measures chosen have been used in prior research and seem to be a good 
conceptual match between the general constructs of human and social capital, and the 
specific requirements of a corporate director. While there may be other useful indicators 
of human and social capital, the measures used in this s udy are an attempt at using as 
many measures that were appropriate and available. The measures of human capital are 
education level, total top management experience, average performance of director’s 
home company, firm tenure, and strategic relatedness of director’s board appointments. 
For education level, total top management experience, and firm tenure, the measures of 
human capital were calculated for each board member and then summed to come up with 
a total level on the board. Conceptually, human and social capital are similar to other 
types of capital in that the overall level is important, so using sums is appropriate. 
However, as a robustness check, I did run models where I used the averages and my 
results were unchanged. Obviously, because the composite scores contain sums, the size 
of the board could over-inflate the levels of human and social capital, but in all of my 
models I control for board size. For the other measures of human capital, the score will be 
calculated for each board member and then averaged to come up with an average level on 
the board. For these measures, it is unclear what a sum of performance or relatedness 
would mean, so using an average is better. 
                                                                                                                                      
lags, and a distributed lag analysis for robustness. 
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Education level was measured as the number of years of schooling wth the 
lowest value of 12 representing a high school education (Kosnik, 1987; Wiersema & 
Bantel, 1992). Total management experience was measured by examining the number of 
years each individual has served as a top executive (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). 
Performance of directors’ home companies was calculated by using the industry-indexed 
return on equity of the company where the director is also an executive for the prior year 
in the models where ROE was the dependent variable. In models where market to book 
value is the dependent variable I used the industry-indexed market to book value of the 
director’s home company. Non-executive outside directors were excluded from this 
measure. Firm tenure is the number of years the individual has served as a director at the 
focal firm. Following Carpenter and Westphal (2001) I measure the relatedness of board 
members’ other appointments along four dimensions: product market, foreign market, 
diversification, and degree of internationalization.  
When determining whether a director is associated with firms that are 
strategically related to the focal firm it is important to look upon strategic dimensions that 
are widely held as being important. Product market similarity was measured by 
examining the number of board appointments that share the same primary SIC code as 
the focal firm and then dividing that by the total number of board appointments.  
Foreign market similarity was measured by counting he number of appointments 
the director has to firms that share a primary foreign market, and then normalizing this by 
the total number of appointments. For example, if a director served on the board of two 
firms that report their primary foreign market as the UK then that director’s appointments 
would show a high degree of similarity. 
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To examine the extent to which the director’s board ppointments are similar in 
their diversification profile, I used an entropy-based diversification index (Palepu, 1985). 
The diversification score is calculated as Σ Pi ln (1 / Pi), where Pi equals the percentage of 
sales a firm received from its ith 6-digit NAICS segment. I then calculated the absolute 
difference between the diversification score of the focal firm and the diversification score 
of each of the firms with which the director is affiliated. I then added the scores and 
normalize them by the number of total appointments. It is important to average these 
scores in order to avoid inflating the overall similarity of a director with many board 
appointments that are somewhat similar. For instance, if a director had affiliations with 
10 other firms that were each similar by 0.1 this would appear equally similar to a 
director that has affiliations with 2 other firms tha  are each similar by 0.5. By averaging 
these scores the true level of similarity in director appointments is represented more 
accurately. This value was then subtracted from the highest value of diversification 
dissimilarity in order to create an index of relatedn ss. While there is not universal 
agreement (Allison, 1990), I must note that some researchers have argued that using 
difference scores is problematic (Cronbach & Furby, 1970; Edwards, 1994). Therefore, in 
order to be thorough each time a difference score is used I ran additional analyses to 
make sure the difference scores used satisfied the constraints outlined by Edwards 
(1994). I followed the procedure outlined by Edwards (1994) and subsequently used in 
other research (Milton & Westphal, 2005) and each of t e measures used satisfied all four 
constraints specified by Edwards. I also ran analyses where I used the constrained and 
unconstrained equations and my results were unchanged, which indicates that using a 
difference score was appropriate for this analysis. 
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To measure the extent to which directors serve on bards that have similar 
degrees of internationalization, I used a modified v rsion of Sullivan’s (1994) composite 
measure of the degree of internationalization (DOI) (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). The 
DOI measure examines separate but distinct areas of internationalization. The DOI 
measure usually has three components, but because of issues regarding data availability I 
was only able to use two of the three components. The first characteristic it examines is 
foreign sales. The level of foreign sales is calculated as the ratio of foreign sales to total 
sales. This characteristic reflects how much a firmdepends on sales to foreign markets. 
The other measure is geographic dispersion, and this is measured by examining the 
number of country subsidiaries as a percentage of the total number of country 
subsidiaries represented in the sample. Each of these characteristics can range from 0 to 
1, and the DOI is calculated by summing the measures. Prior research has shown that 
these measures have high inter-item reliability and load on one factor (Carpenter & 
Westphal, 2001; Sullivan, 1994) except when the firms studied are extremely young 
(Carpenter, Pollock, & Leary, 2003). However, although the firms in this sample are 
large and well-established, I tested the reliability of this index in my own sample and also 
ran factor loadings to make sure that this measure demonstrates a reliable single-factor 
loading. The reliability coefficient was 0.81 which is acceptable, and there was a clear 
single factor loading for both areas of internationalization with each item loading equally 
at 0.77. I calculated the relatedness of this measur  by subtracting the absolute difference 
between the focal firm and the other firm’s with which a director is affiliated and then 
averaging this score. This value was then subtracted from the highest value of DOI 
dissimilarity in order to create an index of relatedn ss.  
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The measures of social capital are total board ties, performance of interlocks, and 
social club memberships.  
Total board ties were measured by examining the total number of other firms that 
the focal firm is connected to through director interlocks (Davis, 1991; Finkelstein, 1992; 
Haunschild, 1994). I excluded duplicate connections— o this measure effectively 
captures the firm’s degree centrality in the board interlock network (Gulati et al., 2000). 
Performance of interlocks was measured using the average industry-indexed performance 
of the firms that the director is tied to. This was then averaged across all directors 
(Finkelstein, 1992). The performance measure used was matched to the dependent 
variable, so that when ROE is the dependent variable the performance average is 
calculated using ROE, and vice-verse when market to bo k value is the dependent 
variable. Social club membership was measured using the total number of memberships 
to exclusive social clubs listed in the Social Register (Belliveau et al., 1996; Palmer & 
Barber, 2001). This measure did not exclude duplicate ties to social clubs, because it is 
important to understand how prestigious the firm’s individual directors are as a group, 
rather than just the total number of social clubs that he board would have access to.  
Each measure of human and social capital was entered into the models 
individually. However, for all models using interaction terms composite variables were 
created and used for ease of analysis. If I had useeach of the individual indicators for 
the variables, this would have resulted in 96 separate interaction terms. This many 
interaction terms would likely cause problems with multicollinearity and would also 
require an extremely large sample in order to have sufficient power. Human and social 
capital are stocks of resources that are embedded or tied to individuals, and are composed 
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of multiple factors. They are not latent variables, like personality or motivation, which 
are measured by using indirect indicators and then assuming the presence of an 
unmeasured but real factor. Instead, they are pools of resources available to individuals 
that can be measured using composite indicators. Therefore, in my analyses when I need 
to composite the variables I will combine the different indicators using summed z-scores 
and using the generated total score in the regression equations. For the purpose of this 
study, summing the data using z-scores is simply a dat  reduction technique used to 
aggregate my constructs and to facilitate the analysis of multiple indicators.  
I have chosen to use summed z-scores for a couple of r asons. Factor analysis 
techniques combine indicators by examining the level of shared variance between 
measures, and then by creating a composite variable using weightings based on that 
shared variance. However, conceptually human and social capital may be indicated by 
different measures that are not likely to be correlated, such as education and experience 
where there is a direct trade off between the two. So, using a factor analytic approach is 
not appropriate. One potential limitation of using a summed z-score is that it assumes an 
equal weight for each indicator of human or social apital. While I do not believe that 
each measure of human and social capital necessarily has an equal impact on an 
individual’s overall level of human and social capit l, extant theory does not suggest an 
alternative weighting scheme a priori. In addition, research has shown that equal 
weighting of indicators may produce regression results that are very similar to more 
sophisticated weightings (Lawshe & Schucker, 1959; Schmidt & Kaplan, 1971; Stanley 
& Wang, 1970). In fact, in some cases simple unit weighting as is done here provides 
superior estimates than does a regression weighting of composite measures (Schmidt, 
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1971). 
Information Demand Measures:  
Average size of home company was measured using the log of sales for directors’ 
home companies. This was then averaged across the board. Average number of 
businesses of home company was measured by counting the number of unique SIC codes 
in which a business participated. When studying the primary effects of diversification, 
simple counts of SIC codes can be just as valid as more complex measures of 
diversification (Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996; Lubatkin, Merchant, & Srinivasan, 
1993). This also avoids the problem of endogeneity from using the entropy 
diversification index in two different places in the same model. Average size of other 
directorships was measured using the log of sales for the companies with which the 
directors are affiliated and then it was averaged across the board. Average number of 
businesses of other directorships was measured by counting the number of unique SIC 
codes in which the directors other board appointmens participated. This was then 
averaged across the board. 
Control Variables 
A firms’ current level of performance may be highly influenced by prior firm 
performance. In order to control for that effect, I included prior firm ROE and prior firm 
market-to-book value in the models using an instrumental variable to control for the 
problem of autoregression (Haveman, 1993). One of the problems with intertypical 
sampling is that it can often be difficult to compare firms across industries (Kimberly, 
1976). Therefore, I controlled for industry differences. I did this in two different ways. 
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The first way was to add a unique dummy variable for each unique industry present in the 
sample. This resulted in over 200 separate dummies. I then added these to the models. 
However, environmental turbulence has been shown to affect diversity and firm 
performance (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). So I alsotried running models where instead 
of using dummies, I included a variable that models the turbulence within the firm’s 
primary industry. This control gave identical result  to using all of the industry dummies 
and so I use this in all of the models due to its much greater simplicity.  
Theory has shown that firm size may affect firm performance (Kimberly, 1976). 
Firm size may also affect the board’s ability to influence firm outcomes. Because firm 
sales are usually highly skewed, firm size was measur d using the log of sales. Logging 
this variable should allow it to more accurately reflect the assumptions of normality 
present within regression models. Proportion of outsiders on board was measured as a 
ratio of outside to inside directors. Directors areclassified as being outside if they are not 
employed by the firm. Having a high proportion of outsiders on the board is one of the 
most commonly used measures of board independence (Dalton et al., 1998; Kosnik, 
1987).   
Blockholder ownership was measured as the percentage of company stock owned 
by parties with at least a five percent stake in the company, who are not officers or 
directors and who have no business ties to the firm(Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993). 
Blockholder ownership is seen as another monitoring mechanism that may influence firm 
performance (Sanders & Boivie, 2004).  
I measured institutional ownership as the total percentage of company stock 
owned by institutional investors like pension or mutual funds (Bethel & Liebeskind, 
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1993). The size of the board may affect how well the group functions (Ancona & 
Caldwell, 1992). Board size is simply the total number of directors on the focal firm’s 
board of directors. CEO contingent compensation may affect the level of monitoring 
necessary by the board (Westphal, 1999). Therefore I controlled for the level of a CEO’s 
pay that is paid in long-term forms. This was measured similar to the above description of 
how board contingent compensation was measured.  
The power of the board is important when determining ts effectiveness at 
influencing firm performance. Therefore, I have attempted to control for a couple of 
aspects of power. Appointments after the CEO can affect the power of directors and their 
ability to contribute to board meetings (Westphal & Zajac, 1995). Therefore, I controlled 
for the number of directors that were appointed after the current CEO took office. The 
CEO often has a great informational advantage over th  outside members of the board 
and so it is important to control for his power. Leadership structure can also affect the 
distribution of power between the CEO and the board (Westphal & Zajac, 1995) 
therefore, I controlled for whether the CEO was also the chairman of the board. This was 
coded as a dummy variable, where a one indicates the positions are held by the same 
individual. The diversity of the board may affect the functioning of the team (Hambrick 
et al., 1996; Knight et al., 1999; Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999). To control for this I 





In this study both my dependent and independent variables are continuous in 
nature and are measured over time. This results in a cross-sectional panel data set. Cross-
sectional panel data can be tested using pooled time-series analyses. These analyses allow 
use of the full sample, and reflect the average effct of the independent variables over the 
full study, thereby giving more accurate estimates than cross-sectional sub-samples.  
Because the data set contains pooled observations, here is a lack of independence 
among observations which violates the assumptions of OLS and subsequently OLS will 
produce biased estimates. I therefore used generaliz d east squares (GLS). GLS is 
designed for analyzing longitudinal data that is continuous in nature and is especially 
good at handling the problem of autocorrelation that occurs with longitudinal models. 
GLS corrects for autocorrelation across panels by generating an autocorrelation 
coefficient. In addition, I was able to run panel-specific autocorrelation coefficients. 
These models generate a separate auto-correlation coefficient for each panel (firm) in the 
data set. The end result is a model that controls for firm-specific correlation across time 
and does a better job of controlling for autocorrelation than a simple pooled 
autocorrelation coefficient. All models reported use the panel-specific autocorrelation. 
Although, for robustness, I also ran models using the pooled autocorrelation coefficient 
and I get substantively similar results. One limitation of GLS is that it does not allow me 
to run random or fixed effects models. However, for this study, random effects models 
are not appropriate because they assume that the subj ct effects are completely 
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uncorrelated with the predictors, which is unlikely here. In order to simulate fixed effects 
models, I ran models where I mean-deviated each variable in the regression equation. 
This procedure simulates fixed-effects models. The results were not substantively 
different, so I report the simpler models.  
Results 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables in this study. Some of the 
predictors are significantly correlated, so to ensure that multicollinearity was not a 
problem I assessed my models using matrix decomposition techniques, as recommended 
by Judge et al. (1988: 870). In all of the models the highest condition index was 14, well 
under the highly conservative upper limit of 20 recommended by Belsley (1991), which 
strongly indicates that collinearity did not affect the hypothesis tests.  
HYPOTHESIS TESTS 
Tables 2 and 3 list the results for the GLS analyses. Table 2 shows the models 
using ROE as the dependent variable, while Table 3 shows the models using market to 
book value as the dependent variable. For each DV Model 1 contains the control 
variables, Model 2 adds the hypothesized main effects individually, Model 3 replaces the 
individual main effects with composite variables, and Model 4 adds the hypothesized 
interactions. For the results of each set of hypotheses I will first examine about the return 
on equity models, and then the market to book models. 
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ROE Models 
Hypothesis 1a predicted that the greater the average level of total compensation 
provided to a company’s board, the higher the firm’s subsequent performance. As Model 
2 shows, this hypothesis was not supported. The coeffi ient was not in the direction 
predicted and was not significant. Hypothesis 1b predicted that the greater the average 
level of contingent compensation provided to a company’s board, the higher the firm’s 
subsequent performance. This hypothesis was also not supported. The coefficient was 
positive but not significant. Hypothesis 1c predicted that the greater the level of firm 
ownership among directors, the higher the firm’s subsequent performance. As Model 2 
shows, this hypothesis received partial support. The coefficient of 2.939 was positive but 
only marginally significant (p<.10). General Hypothesis 1 predicted that the greater the 
level of incentives provided to a company’s board, the higher the firm’s subsequent 
performance. As Model 3 shows this hypothesis was not supported. The coefficient was 
actually negative and only marginally significant (p<.10).  
Hypothesis 2a predicted that the greater the level of education on a company’s 
board, the higher the firm’s subsequent performance. As Model 2 shows this was not 
supported. The coefficient was positive, but not signif cant. Hypothesis 2b predicted that 
the greater the level of total management experience on a company’s board, the higher 
the firm’s subsequent performance. Model 2 shows this hypothesis was supported. The 
coefficient of 0.002 was positive and significant (p<.05). Hypothesis 2c predicted that the 
greater the average performance of directors’ home companies, the higher the firm’s 
subsequent performance. Model 2 shows that this hypot esis was supported. The 
coefficient of 0.053 was positive and significant (p<.001).  
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Hypothesis 2d predicted that the greater the average firm tenure of a company’s 
board, the higher the firm’s subsequent performance. As Model 2 shows, this hypothesis 
was not supported. The coefficient was positive butno  significant. Hypothesis 2e 
predicted that the greater the strategic relatedness of directors’ home companies, the 
higher the firm’s subsequent performance. As Model 2 shows, this hypothesis received 
partial support. Strategic relatedness was measured sing four different measures and 
only one of the measures (the similarity of directors ther boards on the primary foreign 
market) had a coefficient that was positive (0.581) and significant (p<.01). General 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the greater the level of human capital on a company’s board, 
the higher the firm’s subsequent performance. As Model 3 shows, this hypothesis was 
supported. The coefficient of 0.129 was positive and significant (p<.001). 
Hypothesis 3a predicted that the greater the total number of board ties of a 
company’s board, the higher the firm’s subsequent prformance. As Model 2 shows, this 
hypothesis was not supported. The coefficient while significant was negative. Hypothesis 
3b predicted that the greater the average performance of companies with whom the 
directors share interlocks, the higher the firm’s subsequent performance. This hypothesis 
was also not supported. The coefficient was negative and not significant. Hypothesis 3c 
predicted that the greater the number of social club memberships of a company’s board, 
the higher the firm’s subsequent performance. As Model 2 shows, this hypothesis 
received only marginal support. The coefficient of 0.013 was positive buy only 
marginally significant (p<.10). General Hypothesis 3 predicted that the greater the level 
of social capital on a company’s board, the higher t  firm’s subsequent performance. As 
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Model 3 shows, this hypothesis was not supported. The coefficient was actually negative 
and significant. 
Hypothesis 4a predicted that human capital would strengthen the effect of 
incentives on firm performance. While the interaction s significant, the hypothesis is not 
really supported. Because this is an interactive eff ct it is only appropriate to interpret the 
effects of human capital and incentives jointly. In Model 4, the coefficient of director 
incentives was negative and significant (p<.01) andthe coefficient of human capital was 
positive and significant (p<.001), and the interaction coefficient of -0.017 was negative 
and significant (p<.001). Figure 2 uses the coeffici nts from Model 4 to graph the 
interactive effect sizes of director incentives and human capital on ROE. The y axis on 
Figure 2 indicates the change in the firm’s ROE based on changes in the predictor 
variables. For changes in director incentives, fewer incentives is equal to µ - σ, where µ 
and σ are the mean and standard deviation of director incentives; more incentives is equal 
to µ + σ. For changes in human capital, low human capital is equal to µ - σ, where µ and 
σ are the mean and standard deviation of human capital; h gh human capital is equal to µ 
+ σ. I tested and found that the differences between th  points on the graph (low and high 
levels of incentives) and the slopes of the lines (high and low human capital) are 
significant (p<0.001). What this graph shows is that at any level of incentives, having 
higher human capital leads to better firm performance. However, the effect of high levels 
of human capital on ROE actually decreases when incentives to the directors move to 
higher levels (measured as 1 sd above the mean). In addition, the graph also shows that 
moving from low to high incentives significantly changes the effect of low human capital 
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on the performance of the firm. Boards with low levels of human capital actually perform 
significantly better at higher levels of incentives.  
Hypothesis 4b predicted that social capital would strengthen the effect of 
incentives on firm performance. This hypothesis was not supported. Again, I will 
interpret the effects of social capital and incentives jointly. In Model 4, the coefficient of 
director incentives was negative and significant (p<.01) and the coefficient of social 
capital was negative and significant (p<.05), and the interaction coefficient of 0.023 was 
positive and significant (p<.001). Figure 3 uses the coefficients from Model 4 to graph 
the interactive effect sizes of director incentives and social capital on ROE. The y axis on 
Figure 3 indicates the change in the firm’s ROE based on changes in the predictor 
variables. The other variables are graphed in a manner similar to that described above. I 
tested and found that the difference between high and low levels of social capital at low 
levels of incentives was negative and significant (p<0.001), but the difference between 
high and low levels of social capital at high levels of incentives was not significant. In 
addition, I tested and found that the slope of the high social capital line was not 
significant, but the slope of the low social capital line was significant (p<.001). What this 
graph shows is that the effect of social capital on ROE disappears when incentives to the 
directors move from low (measured as 1 sd below the mean) to high levels (measured as 
1 sd above the mean). At low levels, having low leve s of social capital improves the 
firm’s ROE. However, when the firm has higher incentives social capital has no effect.  
Hypothesis 5a predicted that the greater the average size of director’s home 
companies, the lower the firm’s subsequent performance. As Model 2 shows, this 
hypothesis was not supported. Although the coefficint s significant, it is in the opposite 
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direction than predicted. Hypothesis 5b predicted that he greater the average number of 
businesses that director’s home companies participae n, the lower the firm’s subsequent 
performance. As Model 2 shows, this hypothesis was supported. The coefficient of -0.074 
was negative and significant (p<.05). Hypothesis 5c predicted that the greater the average 
size of firms of director’s board appointments, thelower the focal firm’s subsequent 
performance. As Model 2 shows, this hypothesis was not supported. The coefficient was 
positive and not significant. Hypothesis 5d predicted hat the greater the average number 
of businesses that director’s board appointments participate in, the lower the firm’s 
subsequent performance. Model 2 shows that this hypot esis was supported. The 
coefficient of -0.103 was negative and significant. General Hypothesis 5 predicted that 
the greater the level of information-processing demanded of a company’s board, the 
lower the firm’s subsequent performance. As Model 3 shows, this hypothesis was 
supported. The coefficient of -0.018 was negative and significant.  
Hypothesis 6a predicted that human capital would positively moderate the 
negative relationship between information processing demands and firm performance. 
Again, although the interaction is significant in the direction predicted, the results are 
slightly different than the formal prediction. As with the results for Hypothesis 4 I will 
interpret the effects of human capital and information demands jointly. In Model 4, the 
coefficient of information demands was negative and significant (p<.01) and the 
coefficient of human capital was positive and signif cant (p<.001), and the interaction 
coefficient of -0.017 was negative and significant (p<.001). Figure 4 uses the coefficients 
from Model 4 to graph the interactive effect sizes of information demands and human 
capital on ROE. The y axis on Figure 4 indicates the change in the firm’s ROE based on 
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changes in the predictor variables. For changes in information demands, low information 
demand is equal to µ - σ, where µ and σ are the mean and standard deviation of 
information demands; high information demand is equal to µ + σ. For changes in human 
capital, low human capital is equal to µ - σ, where µ and σ are the mean and standard 
deviation of human capital; high human capital is equal to µ + σ. I tested and found that 
the difference between high and low levels of human c pital was statistically significant 
(p<0.001) at both high and low levels of incentives. However, while the slope of the high 
human capital line was significant (p<.001), the slope of the low human capital line was 
not significant. What this graph shows is that high levels of human capital are always 
beneficial to the firm. However, the positive effect of human capital on ROE decreases 
when information demands are at high levels (measurd as 1 sd above the mean). As 
information demands rise directors with high levels of human capital have less of a 
positive effect on firm performance. 
  Hypothesis 6b predicted that social capital would positively moderate the negative 
relationship between information processing demands and firm performance. This 
hypothesis was not supported. Again, I will interprt the effects of social capital and 
information demands jointly. In Model 4, the coefficient of information demands was 
negative and significant (p<.01) and the coefficient of social capital was negative and 
significant (p<.05), and the interaction coefficient of 0.012 was positive and significant 
(p<.001). Figure 5 uses the coefficients from Model 4 to graph the interactive effect sizes 
of information demands and social capital on ROE. The y axis on Figure 5 indicates the 
change in the firm’s ROE based on changes in the predictor variables. The other variables 
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are graphed in a manner similar to that described above. I tested and found that the 
difference between low and high levels of social capital at low levels of information 
demands was significant (p<0.001), but the difference between high and low levels of 
social capital was not significant at high levels of information demand. What this graph 
shows is that the positive effect of low social capital on ROE disappears when 
information demands go from lower to higher levels. At low information demands, 
having low levels of social capital improves the firm’s ROE, however when information 
demands rise social capital loses its effect on firm performance. 
Market to Book Value Models 
Hypothesis 1a predicted that the greater the average level of total compensation 
provided to a company’s board, the higher the firm’s subsequent performance. As Model 
2 shows, this hypothesis was supported. The coefficient of 3.895 was positive and 
significant (p<.001). Hypothesis 1b predicted that the greater the average level of 
contingent compensation provided to a company’s board, the higher the firm’s 
subsequent performance. This hypothesis was not supported. The coefficient was 
negative but not significant. Hypothesis 1c predicted hat the greater the level of firm 
ownership among directors, the higher the firm’s subsequent performance. As Model 2 
shows, this hypothesis was not supported. The coeffi ient was actually negative but only 
marginally significant (p<.10). General Hypothesis 1 predicted that the greater the level 
of incentives provided to a company’s board, the higher the firm’s subsequent 
performance. As Model 3 shows this hypothesis was supported. The coefficient of 1.493 
was positive and significant (p<.05).  
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Hypothesis 2a predicted that the greater the level of education on a company’s 
board, the higher the firm’s subsequent performance. As Model 2 shows this was not 
supported. The coefficient was positive, but not signif cant. Hypothesis 2b predicted that 
the greater the level of total management experience on a company’s board, the higher 
the firm’s subsequent performance. Model 2 shows thi hypothesis was also not 
supported. The coefficient was negative and not significant. Hypothesis 2c predicted that 
the greater the average performance of directors’ home companies, the higher the firm’s 
subsequent performance. Model 2 shows that this hypot esis was not supported. The 
coefficient was negative and not significant. Hypothesis 2d predicted that the greater the 
average firm tenure of a company’s board, the higher t  firm’s subsequent performance. 
As Model 2 shows, this hypothesis was not significant. The coefficient was positive but 
not significant. Hypothesis 2e predicted that the gr ater the strategic relatedness of 
directors’ home companies, the higher the firm’s subsequent performance. As Model 2 
shows, this hypothesis was not supported. Strategic r latedness was measured using four 
different measures and only one of the measures (th similarity of directors other boards 
on the primary foreign market) had a coefficient that was significant, but it was in the 
opposite direction than predicted. General Hypothesis 2 predicted that the greater the 
level of human capital on a company’s board, the higher the firm’s subsequent 
performance. As Model 3 shows, this hypothesis was not supported. The coefficient was 
negative and only marginally significant (p<.10). 
Hypothesis 3a predicted that the greater the total number of board ties of a 
company’s board, the higher the firm’s subsequent prformance. As Model 2 shows, this 
hypothesis was not supported. The coefficient while significant was negative. Hypothesis 
71 
3b predicted that the greater the average performance of companies with whom the 
directors share interlocks, the higher the firm’s subsequent performance. This hypothesis 
was also not supported. The coefficient was positive and not significant. Hypothesis 3c 
predicted that the greater the number of social club memberships of a company’s board, 
the higher the firm’s subsequent performance. As Model 2 shows, this hypothesis was not 
supported. The coefficient was negative and not significant. General Hypothesis 3 
predicted that the greater the level of social capital on a company’s board, the higher the 
firm’s subsequent performance. As Model 3 shows, thi  hypothesis was not supported. 
The coefficient was negative and not significant. 
Hypothesis 4a predicted that human capital would strengthen the effect of 
incentives on firm performance. This hypothesis was not supported. Because this is an 
interactive effect it is only appropriate to interpret the effects of human capital and 
incentives jointly. In Model 4, the coefficient of director incentives was positive but not 
and significant and the coefficient of human capital w s negative and significant (p<.05), 
and the interaction coefficient of -0.460 was negative and significant (p<.05). Figure 6 
uses the coefficients from Model 4 to graph the interactive effect sizes of director 
incentives and human capital on market to book value. The y axis on Figure 6 indicates 
the change in the firm’s market to book value based on changes in the predictor variables. 
For changes in director incentives, fewer incentives is equal to µ - σ, where µ and σ are 
the mean and standard deviation of director incentiv s; more incentives is equal to µ + σ. 
For changes in human capital, low human capital is equal to µ - σ, where µ and σ are the 
mean and standard deviation of human capital; high uman capital is equal to µ + σ. 
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What this graph shows is that the effect of human cpital on market to book value 
becomes significant when incentives to the directors are at high levels (measured as 1 sd 
above the mean). At low levels of incentives, there is no difference between low and high 
levels of human capital, but at high levels of incentives, lower human capital is very 
valuable.  
Hypothesis 4b predicted that social capital would strengthen the effect of 
incentives on firm performance. As Model 4 shows, this hypothesis was not supported. 
The interactive coefficient is positive but not significant. 
Hypothesis 5a predicted that the greater the average size of director’s home 
companies, the lower the firm’s subsequent performance. As Model 2 shows, this 
hypothesis was supported. The coefficient of -2.866 was negative and significant (p<.05). 
Hypothesis 5b predicted that the greater the average number of businesses that director’s 
home companies participate in, the lower the firm’s subsequent performance. As Model 2 
shows, this hypothesis was not supported. The coeffi ient of was actually positive and 
significant (p<.001). Hypothesis 5c predicted that t e greater the average size of firms of 
director’s board appointments, the lower the focal firm’s subsequent performance. As 
Model 2 shows, this hypothesis received only marginal support. The coefficient was 
negative but only marginally significant (p<.10). Hypothesis 5d predicted that the greater 
the average number of businesses that director’s board appointments participate in, the 
lower the firm’s subsequent performance. Model 2 shows that this hypothesis was not 
supported. The coefficient of was positive and significant. General Hypothesis 5 
predicted that the greater the level of information-processing demanded of a company’s 
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board, the lower the firm’s subsequent performance. As Model 3 shows, this hypothesis 
was not supported. The coefficient of was negative but not significant. 
Hypothesis 6a predicted that human capital would positively moderate the 
negative relationship between information processing demands and firm performance. As 
Model 4 shows, this hypothesis was not supported. The coefficient was negative but not 
significant. 
Hypothesis 6b predicted that social capital would positively moderate the negative 
relationship between information processing demands  firm performance. As Model 4 
shows, this hypothesis was not supported. Again, I will interpret the effects of social 
capital and information demands jointly. In Model 4, the coefficient of information 
demands was positive and not significant and the coffi ient of social capital was 
negative and marginally significant (p<.10), and the interaction coefficient of 0.734 was 
positive and significant (p<.001). Figure 7 uses the coefficients from Model 4 to graph 
the interactive effect sizes of information demands and social capital on market to book 
value. The y axis on Figure 7 indicates the change in the firm’s arket to book value 
based on changes in the predictor variables. The otr variables are graphed in a manner 
similar to that described above. What this graph shows is that the effect of social capital 
on ROE changes when information demands go from lower to higher levels. At low 
information demands, having low levels of social capital improves the firm ROE, 
however that relationship flips, when directors have higher information demands high 
social capital becomes valuable, and low social capital become less useful. 
74 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The findings of this study extend prior research on c rporate governance and 
boards of directors in three important ways. First, I theorized and found modest support 
for the idea that the capabilities of directors as measured by their human and social 
capital can affect firm performance. This extends theory on corporate governance by 
demonstrating that the assumption of equal capability present in virtually all perspectives 
on boards is unwarranted. This also sheds some insight into why some studies of board 
performance that simply examine board structure may h ve failed to find significant 
results. Second, I argued and found some evidence that increased information demands 
on directors outside the focal firm will lower the p rformance of the focal firm. This 
extends theory on corporate governance by suggestin that the cognitive limitations of 
directors must be considered constructing models of board effectiveness. Finally, I found 
that the negative effect of information demands is o powerful that it may overpower 
even the most experienced directors and lead to lower firm performance. 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEORY  
This study makes an important contribution to theory and research on corporate 
governance by developing a model of director effectiv ness that incorporates theory on 
director capabilities. Virtually no prior work on boards of directors has considered how 
director capabilities may contribute to overall board effectiveness. I found some support 
for the prediction that firms who have directors with higher levels of human capital 
perform better. This finding provides at least partial support for my argument that 
directors are repositories of unique and valuable bundles of skills and experience. This 
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finding contributes to research on corporate governance by providing partial confirmation 
to the proposed theory about how director capabilities may influence the ability of the 
board to monitor and provide advice.  
It must be noted that, in general, the results in th s study were very weak when 
market to book value is used as the dependent variable. Market to book value is a market 
based measure of performance that compares the ratio of he stock market value of the 
firm with the actual book value of the firm. Firms with higher market to book values are 
seen by the market as having a greater potential to produce higher returns in the future. It 
is not surprising that I find weaker results using this as a measure of performance. The 
theory developed in this study argues that directors with high levels of human and social 
capital will be better able to monitor and provide advice to the executives of the firm. 
This high quality advice and monitoring is more like y to be represented in accounting 
based measures of performance than in market based measures. In general, institutional 
players in the market use variables such as the outsider ratio as proxies for the 
effectiveness of the governance of the firm. It is less likely that the market is cognizant of 
the capabilities of the directors and is incorporating hose capabilities into their valuation. 
Market valuations are based on investor’s perceptions f the firm, and because the 
concept of director capabilities is new, it is less likely to have a signaling effect. Because 
of the weak effect in the market to book models, in this discussion section I concentrate 
on the implications of the findings in the return on equity models. 
By examining director capabilities, this study implicit y questions one of the core 
assumptions of all governance research: the notion that all directors are equally capable. 
This assumption, while unstated, is a part of corporate governance research from a broad 
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range of perspectives including agency theory, power and resource dependence 
perspectives. Most of the work to date in this area questions how much directors actually 
monitor executive behavior (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1986; Westphal, 1998; 
Westphal & Zajac, 1995), rather than questioning the ability of directors to do so. By 
questioning this assumption, the ideas presented here confirm that all boards are not 
created equal. Although companies may have boards filled with similar percentages of 
outsiders and insiders, some structurally similar boards will still vary considerably in 
their ability to both monitor executive action and to provide advice and counsel. Certain 
findings related to human capital are consistent with this assertion. Firms that had 
directors with high levels of top management experience, that came from highly 
performing home firms, and whose other board appointme ts shared similar foreign 
markets had higher performance, after controlling for the ratio of outsiders on the board. 
What this suggests is that current research on agency theory and corporate governance 
that focuses primarily on the structure of boards of directors does not provide a complete 
or accurate picture. Understanding differences in the abilities of boards with similar 
structures should help explain some of the difficulty finding consistent links between 
board structure and firm performance. 
In fact, one of the noteworthy findings of this study is that the effect of the 
outsider ratio actually changes once the capabilities of the board are added into the 
model. In Model 1, the outsider ratio was positive and significant. However, when the 
capabilities of the board are added individually in Model it becomes insignificant. 
Moreover, when the composite variables are used and when the interactions are added, 
the outsider ratio actually becomes negative and significant. In today’s corporate 
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governance climate, most boards have a majority of independent directors, but many 
boards are still not effective. What this finding hi hlights is that the ratio of outsiders on 
the board may provide very little information about the quality or effectiveness of the 
board or may be masking the effect of human capital. In addition, this finding supports 
some perspectives in the corporate governance literature that suggest that a greater 
proportion of outsiders may actually have a negative effect. For instance, some studies 
have argued that a greater proportion of outsiders on the board may be harmful because it 
reduces the overall level of advice giving on the board (Westphal, 1999). Other studies 
also suggest that having a greater proportion of outsiders on the board may be 
problematic in firms in highly turbulent industries because of the large information gap 
between directors and executives (Sanders & Boivie, 2004). 
It is also interesting to note that contrary to the pr dictions of this study, the effect 
of social capital on firm performance was generally negative. In fact, based on the graphs 
of the interactions between social capital and incentiv s and social capital and 
information demands, social capital may only have a positive effect at extremely high 
levels of incentives and/or information demands (more than 1 sd above the mean). It is 
difficult to understand why boards that have directors with high levels of social capital 
may perform more poorly, but perhaps we can speculate about some possible reasons. 
Social capital comes at a cost. For a director to have access to more information, power, 
or prestige, that individual must have more contacts nd more responsibilities. This may 
limit the time that the director has to spend on director activities at the focal firm. There 
is some research that indicates that some of the advice-giving provided by outside 
directors occurs outside board meetings (Westphal, 1999). If this is the case, directors 
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with high levels of social capital may be more difficult to reach, or more unwilling or 
unable to spend time outside of board meetings on their board duties. This may also mean 
that the general effect of social capital is actually more similar to the effect of 
information demands. In addition, it is possible that directors with high levels of social 
capital feel that they do not need to expend as much effort regarding their board duties. 
They may feel isolated from the pressure to work hard and expend effort because of their 
large number of contacts and positive reputation. Alternatively, because directors with 
high levels of social capital realize that they contribute to the legitimacy of the firm they 
may feel less of a need to contribute to its performance.  
Another contribution of this study was through incorporating the concept of 
information demands into thinking on board effectiveness. The findings of this study 
generally support the notion that greater information demands of directors lowers the 
performance of the firm. Moreover, it appears that t e effect of information demands is 
strong enough that it actually weakens the impact of having directors with high levels of 
human capital. High levels of information demands outside the focal firm may 
overwhelm even the most experienced and skilled directo s and render them less able to 
provide quality monitoring and/or meaningful advice. Another interpretation of this 
finding is that information demands may affect directors with high human capital more 
due to the demands at other firms where they serve. So, rather than overwhelming the 
directors, high information demand board appointments may just require more time and 
leave them less available to contribute to the focal firm.  
Another noteworthy finding of this study is that director compensation did not 
have a main effect on firm performance, only a contingent effect. Moreover, as Figures 2 
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and 3 show, the effect of incentives is different than predicted. With regards to human 
capital, boards filled with high levels of human capit l had higher performance under 
lower levels of compensation. With regards to social pital, at higher levels of 
compensation social capital had no effect. In fact, higher levels of incentives made the 
positive effect of low social capital disappear. This may be a side effect of monetary 
incentives. Perhaps higher compensation of directors replaces their intrinsic motivation 
with extrinsic motivation and therefore directors do just enough to get their compensation 
and produce fewer positive citizenship behaviors (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999). What 
this also may mean is that that human capital and incentives are substitutes for each other. 
Incentives may cause directors to devote extra timeand effort to their task, which at least 
partially overcomes their lack of human capital. However, if directors have high levels of 
human capital, they may not need to expend additional effort and/or devote much extra 
time outside meetings, so incentives make little difference. 
This study also contributes to research on corporate governance through its 
inclusion of theory from different fields that have generally been ignored when 
examining board effectiveness. Most prior work on crporate governance examined one 
or two aspects of board effectiveness in isolation, a d used only one theoretical 
perspective. By drawing upon research from learning, human capital, social capital, 
information processing, and incentives, this study found a number of consistent links 
between the characteristics of the board and the performance of the firm. Prior work 
using human capital has often failed to explore why the proposed human capital measures 
would truly indicate valuable experience. In this study I drew upon research in learning 
theory, to more fully explore why experience may contribute to a director’s level of 
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human capital. I have drawn upon theories from human and social capital to suggest a 
number of factors that may be proxies for director capabilities. In addition, I have used 
theory on information processing to show that increased demands on director’s time and 
energy may have a negative effect on board effectivness. This research expands 
governance researcher’s toolkit of available ideas and theories to build a more inclusive 
model of director effectiveness. 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT PRACTICE  
This model has clear implications for practice. If some directors are more 
qualified than others, then firms should be selectiv  about whom they recruit to fill 
vacancies on their boards. Director selection should consider more than just directors’ 
previous experience, but should also consider directo s’ external information demands. 
This study shows that firms seeking to fill vacancies on their board may need to expand 
the ways in which they examine potential board candidates. For instance, firms should 
first try to assess the level of human capital a director possesses by looking into his/her 
management experience, prior success, and the relatedness of his/her other board 
appointments. In addition to the director’s human cpital, firms would need to examine 
the information demands placed on directors outside of this directorship. Firms could 
look at the complexity of director’s home companies and also their other board 
appointments to make sure that they are not overloaded. Finally, these findings here also 
suggest that the compensation packages of directors may be less important than has been 
previously thought, or perhaps they need to be redesign d to more fully motivate 
directors. 
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This study also demonstrates that shareholders may need to examine boards more 
closely than just examining the ratio of outsiders to insiders, in order to determine if the 
board is able to adequately protect their interests. Recently, there has been a large public 
outcry for increased board independence. However, th  model developed here suggests 
that increased independence may not be enough to truly b ing about effective corporate 
governance reform. In fact, after controlling for human and social capital, increased 
independence may actually hurt firm performance. What t is suggests is that investors 
and governance reformers need to consider the capabilities as well as the structure of the 
board. 
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
One potentially rich area for future research is to further explore the relationship 
between human and social capital. While I acknowledge that they may affect each other, 
in this study I measured both human and social capital at certain points in time and 
predicted their effects. Future research may want to consider how the levels of human 
and social capital interact and affect each other ov time. 
In addition, because this study is an attempt to build an early model that includes 
director capabilities, I am not examining any potentially moderating effects of the 
broader external environment. Future research may be able to expand and refine this 
model by considering how the model may be affected by different environmental 
conditions. For instance, environmental stability has been shown to affect board 
functioning (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). While I control for turbulence in this study, it 
may also have potential moderating effects.  
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One area that is a potentially rich area of future research relates to the differences 
in the level of involvement of outside directors. As my findings show, the compensation 
of directors does not appear to be an accurate proxy for the motivation or involvement of 
directors. Future research could more accurately assess director motivation or 
involvement. One of the original goals of this study was to try and measure director 
involvement directly using a survey instrument. I sent a questionnaire to each individual 
serving as an outside director at the firms in the sample. I sent out a total of 4273 surveys 
and I received a total of 408 survey responses back, 404 which completed the entire 
survey. This led to a response rate of just over 9%. This meant that I was not able to test 2 
planned hypotheses. Originally, I planned to argue that firms that have directors who are 
more fully involved in their duties will have higher performance, and that this effect 
would be strengthened when the directors had high levels of human and social capital. 
However, because of the extremely low response rate, I was unable to assess those 
hypotheses in this study. Future research that is more successful at directly assessing 
director motivation and involvement would be extremely useful in understanding director 
effectiveness.  
CONCLUSION  
In this study I developed a model of board effectiveness that incorporates director 
capabilities. I proposed and found that structurally similar boards may have very different 
impacts on the performance of the firm based on the capabilities of the directors. Boards 
comprised of directors with high levels of human capital can improve the performance of 
the firm. This model helps us to understand why some boards of directors seem better 
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than others at monitoring and at advice giving, even though they are similar in structure. 
The theory presented here drew upon research from the corporate governance literature to 
question one of the underlying assumptions used in corporate governance research. 
Research into boards of directors can be improved by using a more accurate picture of 
director capability. By questioning some of the assumptions underlying much of the work 
in corporate governance, we can gain a greater understanding of how boards work and 
what makes them effective.  
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STUDY TWO: DETERMINANTS OF BOARD-LEVEL HUMAN AND 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Introduction 
Large companies are almost continually recruiting directors to sit on their boards. 
Most public companies have boards of 10-15 people, and a portion of those directors 
either leave the board or are up for reappointment each year. This means that these 
companies are frequently faced with the task of retaining qualified director candidates 
and finding new qualified director candidates. The task of retaining and recruiting 
qualified director candidates is difficult and requires companies to provide directors with 
possible enticements to serve. However, the demands ssociated with being a director in 
a public company have increased dramatically over th  past 70 years. Over time, the 
general consensus about the proper role of a director has developed into the view 
promulgated by agency theory, with the director as an active watchdog of management.  
Recent corporate scandals and other types of poor corporate performance have also led to 
calls for increased governance reform through greate  director oversight. These proposed 
reforms and corporate governance practices imply greate  duties for directors as well as 
an increased level of personal scrutiny.  
The level of proposed reform and change present in the institutional environment 
sets the backdrop for this study. These broad institutional pressures have led to calls for 
companies to implement specific governance practices. However, given the fact that 
companies are responding to institutional pressure, one question that has been left 
unanswered is how companies’ implementations of agency theory practices and reforms 
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will actually affect directors’ personal interests, and by extension, how will they affect 
companies’ ability to attract and retain good directors? What this study explicitly 
considers is how the differences in corporate governance practices across firms will affect 
companies’ ability to recruit and retain directors with high levels of human and social 
capital. Little attention has been given to the preferences of directors or the implications 
of violating those preferences. The idealized perception of directors as active, 
independent monitors of action may be enshrined within the minds of institutional actors, 
but there has been little thought regarding how directors feel about serving in firms that 
emphasize taking on such an active role. In fact, most of the work on boards from an 
agency theory perspective does not even address the i sue of how directors might react to 
increased demands. This study argues for the need to xpand our theorizing on boards 
beyond agency theory alone and to view directors through a human resources perspective 
as a valuable asset that must be attracted and retained.  
In this paper I go beyond a simple agency theoretic view of boards and draw upon 
research and theory from human resources, economics, and organization theory to argue 
that firm-level practices designed to improve board effectiveness by increasing 
independence may actually be decreasing the overall qua ity of directors sitting on 
boards. Specifically, many efforts by firms to improve board independence actually raise 
the costs of being a director. Active, independent boards require directors to give more 
input, prepare more fully, and participate more heavily. In addition, changes in the 
institutional environment surrounding boards have increased the risk to a director’s 
finances and reputation. As the costs of being a director rise relative to the benefits, the 
most talented and experienced directors will be less willing to serve on boards and will 
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take fewer board appointments. The most experienced and well-connected directors face 
the most downside risk from potentially negative board appointments. In addition, 
directors with high levels of human and social capital also have the most choice regarding 
which boards they choose to sit on. Consequently, when the demands and risk associated 
with being a director vary across firms, the most qualified directors will be the most able 
to choose board appointments that match their risk preferences.  
This paper contributes to theory and research on corporate governance by 
developing hypotheses about the unintended consequences of agency theory prescriptions 
for board effectiveness. Both agency theory research on boards and work on boards from 
a power perspective tout the value of having boards filled with active, independent 
directors who monitor managers. However, research from each of these perspectives has 
failed to consider how differences in governance practices across firms, and therefore 
differences in the roles and workloads of directors will affect individual directors’ 
willingness to serve. The general prescription to all governance problems is that the board 
needs to be more active and do a more thorough job of evaluating managers’ decisions. 
Lost in this solution is a consideration of how thecosts of forcing directors to do more 
will influence their desire to participate in this process. I propose that companies that 
implement these governance prescriptions and compel dir ctors to do more and face 
greater scrutiny will have a more difficult time rec uiting and retaining directors with 
high levels of human and social capital.  
A secondary contribution of this paper is its use of both agency theory and human 
resource theory to understand boards. Much of the li erature on boards and corporate 
governance relies primarily on agency theory to understand boards and board 
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effectiveness. The proposed agency theory “fixes” are ttempts at controlling the 
behavior of both managers and directors. In the case of managers, agency theory 
prescriptions attempt to control their behavior by installing active, independent directors 
who monitor their decisions. With regards to directors, agency theory prescriptions 
attempt to control their behavior by instituting strong pressures regarding the time and 
effort level they devote to their role. What these theoretical prescriptions haven’t 
considered is the logic of market power. Directors a e valuable human resources that 
have to be attracted and retained. There is a scarcity of directors with high levels of 
human and social capital. These individuals have the power to leave the board or to 
refrain from accepting appointments. By drawing upon human resource arguments the 
theory developed in this paper shows that a simple agency perspective is inadequate in 
understanding how differences in corporate governance practices will ultimately affect 
firms.  
Background 
In order to properly understand and develop theory regarding the effect of firm-
level governance practices on directors, it is important to first consider how the prevailing 
conception of the board’s role has changed over time. The current view of a director as 
providing active oversight of management is very different than the earliest conception of 
the role of a director. In fact, in Berle and Means (1932) initial work on the potential 
agency problems arising from the structure of the modern corporation, they actually 
identified the board as being part of the management of the firm, rather than being a 
mechanism for management oversight. Later, Jensen and Meckling (1976) introduced the 
88 
notion that boards may be able to monitor executives on behalf of shareholders. This led 
to a tremendous amount of research on boards of directors, most arguing that an effective 
board is comprised of outside directors who are not beholden to management (see 
Eisenhardt, 1989 for a review).  
Despite the arguments for active, independent directo s, there is evidence that 
suggests that the view of directors carefully watching over and evaluating the actions of 
management may be unrealistic. Mace’s (1986) pioneeri g discussion with directors 
about what they actually do concluded that, while many directors provided valuable 
contributions, much of what directors did was symbolic and that they had little actual 
power. Similarly, later discussions with directors confirmed this idea while providing 
suggestions for how the situation might be changed (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). Consider 
this quote by a director: 
In the early years, being invited to join a board was a sign of respect . . . some 
people served on a lot of boards because the duties were minimal. We weren’t 
given much information before a meeting and even attendance wasn’t essential. If 
you went, it was to listen to management describe its plans (Lorsch & MacIver, 
1989 p. 5).  
 
What this quote illustrates is that directors understood and at least partially 
acquiesced to this limited role. This theme of limited responsibility was also understood 
and implied in other practitioner articles that decri d the fact that directors did not 
attempt to “rock the boat” by challenging management (Patton & Baker, 1987).  
Other, more scholarly studies also indicate that directors may not have had as 
much power as the work in agency theory would suggest (Westphal, 1998; Zajac & 
Westphal, 1996). What both the practitioner and the scholarly studies suggest is a picture 
89 
of boards that is far removed from a pure agency vision of boards as vigilant monitors on 
behalf of shareholders (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988). In reality, in the past, a board 
appointment may have been seen as an opportunity to network with other executives, to 
make some extra money, to learn about other companies, and to gain status and prestige 
(Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). And although this might not have been the most effective 
practice for shareholders, until recently there was little formal pressure on directors that 
would cause them to change their behavior. 
Throughout the 1980s and 90s, articles in the scholarly literature and the popular 
press continued to call for directors to more fully take on the role of impartial observers 
and evaluators of management. Recently however, the institutional climate appears to 
have changed and the pressure for active, independent boards has intensified. Corporate 
scandals in the past few years have highlighted some f the potential problems that can 
occur when boards are not functioning effectively. In a personal conversation with me, a 
director said this:  
I think in some companies in the past, the board didn’t really do its job. The board 
just rubber-stamped everything. Board members wouldn’t always show up for 
board meetings because there was not that much riding on it.  
 
What this quote illustrates is that directors in the past may not have been fully 
active in their role and that corporate scandals may be a natural result of this. 
There is also increased pressure on directors from institutional owners, 
shareholders, and legislators. For example, directos face increased legal risk of lawsuits 
by shareholders if they fail or are negligent in their duties (Beck & Bhagat, 1997; 
Mooney, 2003). In addition, both the NYSE and the NASDAQ adopted policies in 2002 
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that require a majority of independent directors on the board. In addition, the proposed 
NYSE standards require that in order to be considered independent, a director must have 
no material relationship with the listed company. The NYSE standards also propose that 
the standing committees of the board should be composed entirely of independent 
directors.  
This change in perspective and demand for directors is also reflected in new 
legislation. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires that the audit committee be 
comprised entirely of outsiders. Overall, it is clear that many institutional players believe 
that boards need to be “fixed” and that the solution is increased independence. In fact, the 
evidence presented above demonstrates that the agency p rspective on boards appears to 
have become institutionalized or taken-for-granted by many prominent institutional 
actors (Davis, 2005; Sanders & Boivie, 2004; Zajac & Westphal, 1995). It is interesting 
to note, however, that empirical research has shown weak effects at best of the effect of 
outsiders on firm performance (Bhagat & Black, 2001; Dalton et al., 1998). 
What the preceding discussion illustrates is that te institutional climate has 
changed for directors. In the past, it may have been acceptable for directors to be less 
active and involved, but strong institutional norms a  well as more direct, negative 
outcomes such as shareholder lawsuits indicate that this is no longer acceptable to 
shareholders and other activists. However, although there is general pressure on firms to 
adopt stricter corporate governance provisions and practices, there is still a significant 
amount of variance between firms on the form that adoption of these practices takes. In 
addition, although the notion that directors need to be independent watchdogs of 
managers is clearly supported both by agency theory and by institutional actors, what has 
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not been considered is how directors feel about taking on this role. This study considers 
how a number of different governance practices willaffect directors’ decisions to serve 
on boards. Using agency theory alone, it is not clear how directors will respond to 
differences in companies’ governance practices, especially when there is still 
considerable variance across firms. In order to understand how the demands asked of 
directors by firms’ governance profiles will affect their interests, it is important to 
consider directors interests for serving. In order to effectively do so, I develop theory that 
re-incorporates a human resource perspective back into our theorizing about corporate 
governance practices. 
Theory Development and Hypotheses  
Over the past 20 years, the dominant logic used to explain the role of directors has 
shifted dramatically. Zajac and Westphal (1995; 2004) have argued and provided 
evidence that the governing logic behind corporate governance has shifted from a human 
resources to an agency perspective. From the human resources perspective, managers are 
a valuable resource that may improve the firm’s competitive position (Zajac & Westphal, 
1995). The agency perspective assumes that managers, if not monitored, will pursue 
corporate strategies that advance their own interests rather than shareholders (Davis & 
Thompson, 1994; Zajac & Westphal, 1995). From this perspective managers’ self-
interested pursuits generate agency costs that must be managed either through incentive 
alignment or other governance mechanisms like monitori g (Fama & Jensen, 1983). This 
shift in perspective arose from investor dissatisfaction with corporate performance in the 
1970s and led to an increased use of agency justifications for corporate governance 
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practices (Davis, Diekmann, & Tinsley, 1994; Davis & Thompson, 1994; Zajac & 
Westphal, 1995). In fact, the agency perspective on b ards appears to have so broadly 
diffused that it has achieved taken-for-granted statu  among corporate stakeholders 
(Davis, 2005; Davis et al., 1994). 
Under the governing logic of agency theory, the role f the board is that of 
“decision control” (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Directors a e there to help combat the agency 
costs generated by self-interested managers through setting compensation plans, and 
monitoring executive action. Agency theory is rooted in an economic conception of 
individuals (Eisenhardt, 1989). Implicit in agency theory is the notion that directors are 
motivated to fulfill their duties out of self-interst. In fact, early work from an agency 
perspective argued that directors would be motivated to fulfill their duties out of a desire 
to maintain a reputation as a good director (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hermalin & Weisbach, 
1991; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988) or because of a legal obligation (Baysinger & 
Hoskisson, 1990). For instance, Fama and Jensen (1983) made the case that a market for 
directors exists and the presence of that market would provide directors with the 
necessary incentive to actively monitor executives in order to enhance their reputation as 
a director and therefore improve their chances of receiving multiple board appointments. 
There is some limited empirical evidence that supports this idea of a market for directors. 
For example, Gilson (1990) found that board turnover increases after firms declare 
bankruptcy. In addition, Srinivasan (2004) found that when a firm restated earnings 
downward board turnover was 51% in the following year, and that directors also lost 26% 
of their positions on other boards. Finally, a forthcoming study shows that directors at 
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restating firms are 70% more likely to lose their positions than are directors at firms that 
do not restate earnings (Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton, & Dalton, Forthcoming). 
The prior discussion examined agency views of board effectiveness. It primarily 
addresses why directors who are on boards might choose to monitor executives. Although 
agency theory has a lot to say about what governance practices companies should 
implement, it has very little to say about directors interests regarding those practices. 
Agency theory has paid little attention to the question of why someone (especially 
someone who is already a highly-paid, extremely busy executive) might choose to serve 
on a board. In contrast, a human resource perspective on corporate leaders points to the 
importance of understanding why directors join boards, in order to attract and retain 
them. It is important to understand why directors serve on boards so that we can predict 
how differences in firms’ governance practices will inf uence their willingness to serve. 
Understanding directors’ interests is important if we are really interested in understanding 
how differences between firms’ corporate governance practices will ultimately affect 
firms’ ability to recruit and retain directors with high human and social capital.  
This leads to my perspective that we need to re-incorporate a human resource 
perspective on directors into theory on corporate governance. An HR perspective on 
corporate leaders points to the importance of understanding why directors join boards, in 
order to attract and retain them. Lorsch and MacIver (1989) interviewed directors and 
asked them why they served on boards. Directors said that they accepted board 
appointments because it gave them the opportunity to make valuable contacts and 
friendships with other business leaders and improve their social status or prestige (Lorsch 
& MacIver, 1989). Another common response was that executives accepted board 
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appointments because they felt they could learn by being involved with firms facing a 
different set of strategic opportunities and challeng s (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). Many 
directors are non-CEO top executives and they believe that having board appointments 
may increase their likelihood of promotion to CEO in the future (Lorsch & MacIver, 
1989). Directors also expressed a desire to serve to gain knowledge and to gain social 
contacts that might improve their options regarding job mobility (Lorsch & MacIver, 
1989). My discussions and interviews with directors (in an admittedly non-random 
sample) provided answers that are consistent with those given by the directors talked to 
by Lorsch and MacIver, but with some interesting differences. For instance, some of the 
directors that I spoke with mentioned the compensation as affecting their decision to 
serve. In addition, many of the directors that I spoke with mentioned that they would only 
accept board positions where they felt they could learn and improve their skills by 
applying their experience in a new context.  
The reasoning and logics that directors mention are ve y consistent with a human 
resource perspective of corporate leaders. Knowledge, valuable contacts, friendships, 
prestige, and job mobility are all resources that contribute to an individual’s pool of 
human or social capital. Each of the benefits that directors mentioned (except for job 
mobility) should improve the ability of the executive to be useful and contribute at his/her 
home firm. What these various motivations support is the notion that directors choose to 
serve because they believe that their board service will improve their skills and 
qualifications as an executive. In addition, by listing a set of benefits and motivations, the 
directors are implicitly acknowledging that they believe the benefits of board service to 
outweigh the costs. Therefore, it is important to understand how differences in firms’ 
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corporate governance practices will influence directors’ perception of the demands and 
roles of a director and may therefore change the internal calculus of value for directors.  
As mentioned previously, corporate stakeholders such as institutional investors, 
stock exchanges and regulators are pressing boards to become more involved and also 
more accountable for firm performance. These calls ri e from the agency logic that 
dominates thinking about corporations (Zajac & Westphal, 2004). However, because of 
this over-reliance on agency theory, there has been little consideration in this debate for 
how companies’ efforts to increase director involvement through the implementation of 
different governance practices may affect directors. This is clearly an important 
oversight, because implicit in agency theory arguments about self-interested directors is 
the notion that directors are influenced by the costs of being a director as well as the 
benefits. In fact, while normative agency theory implicitly draws upon utility theories of 
individual behavior to predict an executive’s tendecy to act in self-interested ways, or 
directors’ desire to maintain their reputation; it has failed to explicitly consider how the 
costs of being a director might impact director’s choi e to serve on a board in the first 
place. In contrast, a human resource perspective of corporate leaders, articulates the 
importance of using salary and rewards to attract and retain scarce managerial talent 
(Zajac & Westphal, 1995). This perspective more explicitly considers the cost benefit 
equation and how that affects corporate leaders’ decisions to use and deploy their 
managerial talent.  
Agency and human resource perspectives are not incompatible. While they do 
have some differing assumptions about both managers and the firm, they also share some 
commonalities. Agency theory assumes that top managers are relatively fungible 
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resources who tend to be self interested (Davis & Thompson, 1994). On the other hand, 
human resource perspectives assume that corporate le ders contain unique strategic 
knowledge that is necessary and useful for the firm(Zajac & Westphal, 1995). However, 
both human resource and agency perspectives share the assumption that corporate leaders 
try to maximize their subjected expected utility. Where they differ is in what factors they 
explicitly consider would contribute to the utility of the corporate leaders. Agency 
perspectives generally assume that managers are driv n by the desire to maximize their 
own personal wealth, and that financial costs and benefits are the primary driver of a 
manager’s personal utility. This assumption generates the classic argument that managers 
generate agency costs because they are likely to pursue their own financial interests 
above the interests of the firm (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In 
contrast, human resource perspectives generally assume a broader range of motivations 
that managers may consider important when maximizing their personal utility. For 
instance, human resource perspectives assume that managers feel a sense of stewardship 
over the firm (Zajac & Westphal, 2004). Therefore, managers are likely to seek to 
maximize the firm’s performance because doing so provides non-financial contributions 
to their personal utility. Consequently, incorporating a human resource perspective into 
our theorizing about director behavior makes a valuable contribution because it allows us 
to consider a wider array of potential costs that sould affect directors’ behavior.  
It is especially important to think about the impact of the subjective expected 
costs of being a director because these costs are inc asing. As early as 1990, one 
observer concluded that being the director of a public company is an “economically 
stupid decision” (Sahlman, 1990: 28). Sahlman (1990) argued that the pay does not 
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adequately reward for the time and for the reputation l and financial risk. If that was true 
in 1990, it is increasingly true today. Included in those rising costs of being a director are 
the potential downside risks. Shareholder lawsuits are on the rise. Class action suits by 
shareholders rose by 60% in 2001 (Investor Relations Business, 2002), and 31% in 2002 
(Mooney, 2003). Separate from the number of lawsuits, the size of shareholder lawsuits 
also rose dramatically in 2003 (Hofmann, 2003). Director’s risk exposure to any 
particular lawsuit may also be rising. A recent court decision involving Disney was the 
first to allow a case against directors to stand not just because directors were involved in 
self-dealing, but merely because they were failing to uphold their duties (Knowledge at 
Wharton, 2003a). In addition, the recent decisions regarding the Worldcom and the Enron 
boards, have allowed individual directors to be personally liable above and beyond any 
indemnity protections. Finally, even some of the benefits that directors provide as being 
reasons to serve may be becoming less pronounced. For example, one of the reasons 
directors gave for accepting board appointments was for the increased social prestige. 
However, in today’s climate, being a board member is most likely less prestigious than it 
once was. In fact, there is a definite risk for directors of damaging their personal 
reputation. Directors have a desire to maintain a reputation as a good director (Hermalin 
& Weisbach, 1991) and being associated as a director of Enron, Worldcom, or Tyco 
could taint a person’s reputation for years to come.  
As the costs and potential risks of being a director increase, and the benefits of 
being a director stay stable or decline, I would expect utility-maximizing individuals to 
be less inclined to accept board appointments. This idea is supported by anecdotal 
evidence and descriptive survey data. In a recent survey by McKinsey, 25% of directors 
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said that they had resigned from a board or turned down a new board appointment 
because of concerns about liability (Felton & Watson, 2002). Directors expressed similar 
concerns in my interviews. One of the questions I asked was about recruiting new 
directors. Here are a few of the responses I receivd: 
The heavy-handedness of some of the government reforms and the legislation will 
convince some good board candidates not to serve on boards, especially given 
current compensation levels. 
 
It is definitely more difficult to recruit directors today than in the past . . . The 
negative publicity associated with these corporate scandals has made directorships 
fall in their level of prestige. It used to be that sit ing on a board was a badge of 
honor, or something to be proud of. It is not like that anymore . . . (Also) directors 
are on the hook more than in the past, both financially and repuationally. They are 
at a greater risk of real loss. 
 
It is more difficult to recruit directors today than in the past. This is not because 
people are completely unwilling to serve; it is just that they are cutting down on 
the total number of boards that they sit on. There is more time and energy 
required to be on a board today, and so people wantto be on fewer boards. 
 
A number of theoretical perspectives also support this general argument. For 
example, Beatty and Zajac (1994) argued that managers ar  risk averse and that managers 
of riskier firms were less likely to accept stock based forms of compensation. This made 
it more difficult for risky firms to counter the agency problem and forced these firms to 
rely on additional agency mechanisms to monitor executive action. Most directors are 
also top managers and are likely to be risk averse, so as the threat of lawsuits rises, they 
should be less willing to serve on boards.  
As mentioned above, economic theories of motivation also support the notion that 
as the costs of being a director increase, a director should be less willing to accept an 
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appointment (Simon, 1959). Normative agency theory implicitly draws upon subjective 
expected utility (SEU) theory to describe the motivation of executives and directors. 
utility theory was developed by economists to predict individual behavior (Marschak, 
1950). The basic premise of general utility theory is that rational decision makers have 
relatively stable preferences for different outcomes, and they choose their actions based 
on the likelihood of maximizing their utility (Arrow, 1951; Marschak, 1950). Utility 
theory also recognizes that because all outcomes are not equally likely, decision makers 
weigh their utility with regards to bearing risk and incorporate that into their choice 
(Arrow, 1951, 1958; Friedman & Savage, 1948) and that ese weightings are based on 
subjective probabilities. While some of the specific assumptions of pure utility theory are 
problematic in that they don’t conform to people’s actual behavior (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974), the broad idea of maximizing subjectiv  expected utility (SEU) has 
received extensive empirical support (Mosteller & Nogee, 1951; Schoemaker, 1982). 
Theorists working in SEU theory have also argued that as the problem becomes more 
significant and irreversible, the decision will conf rm more closely to traditional 
expected utility models (Beach & Mitchell, 1978). The risk of being sued and losing your 
reputation should clearly decrease a director’s perceived utility from accepting a board 
appointment.  
Theory regarding job choice may also help us understand how increased pressure 
on directors will influence their choice to serve. Literature on job choice focuses on two 
main factors, the content of job acceptance decisions (Bretz, Ash, & Dreher, 1989; 
Caldwell & O'Reilly, 1985; Schneider, 1987) and theprocess of job acceptance decisions 
(Wanous, Keon, & Latack, 1983). Content perspectives argue that individuals look at the 
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attributes of a job to decide which job or career to choose (Cable & Judge, 1996). They 
suggest that people choose jobs or organizations based on how well they fit a perceived 
emotional or psychological need (Bretz et al., 1989; Cable & Judge, 1996). The process 
perspective looks at how information is used to make  choice about which job or 
organization to join. These studies primarily look at job choice using expected value 
models (Wanous et al., 1983). Expectancy theory share  some similarities to utility 
theory discussed above. With regards to job choice, it argues that individuals look at the 
attractiveness (valence) of the potential outcomes associated with a job or organization, 
and then they also look at the likelihood (instrumentality) that those outcomes will be 
present (Wanous et al., 1983). As the attractiveness of the potential outcomes from board 
service goes down, so will the likelihood of accepting the position. Changes in the 
governance climate should have lowered the attractiveness of the potential outcomes and 
also raised the likelihood of the most negative outc mes occurring. 
The preceding theoretical perspectives all argue that as the position of director 
becomes less attractive, people will be less willing to serve and accept the position. 
Subjective expected utility theory, risk aversion, and the literature on job choice, all 
support the underlying premise of a human resource perspective on corporate leaders. 
Directors, who possess pools of valuable skills, experience, knowledge, and contacts, will 
consider the utility of accepting and/or retaining board positions. This should be 
especially true of the directors with the highest levels of human and social capital. 
Human and social capital of executives accrue through experience, success, and the 
application of valuable time and effort. Directors with high levels of social capital have 
the most to lose with regards to their reputation and will be most averse to the risk of 
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damaging that reputation. As the risks associated with being a director rise, these talented 
directors will be wary of the losses they may incur because of their board service, and 
will decline board positions more frequently than will directors with less human and 
social capital. In addition, corporations will have a harder time attracting new directors 
and retaining the qualified ones they have. This is a labor market, and changes in demand 
may reduce the supply of the most qualified candidates. 
In addition, as a director accumulates human and social capital, they can be 
increasingly selective about the boards they serve on. Thus, boards that require directors 
to make greater investments of their time and effort and incur greater risks will have 
more difficulty competing for the best directors. According to a recent survey the best 
directors are likely to receive multiple board offers and tend to not accept every board 
invitation they receive (Felton & Watson, 2002). In addition, while the directors with the 
most human and social capital may have the most to lose if a directorship goes badly, the 
directors with the most human and social capital also have less to gain from additional 
appointments. They already have a high reputation and a lot of experience, therefore the 
learning and status benefits they will derive from any particular appointment is low. This 
will allow them to be more selective about which appointments they accept. 
Consequently, there is a greater likelihood that the costs of a demanding or high risk 
appointment will outweigh the benefits for the directors who bring the most human and 
social capital to the board.  
Taken together, these perspectives support the notion that as the costs of being a 
director rise, it should be more difficult to recruit and retain directors with high levels of 
human and social capital, without proportional increases in benefits. Therefore, factors or 
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governance practices that increase the duties (or that increase the difficulty of those 
duties) of the board should lead to lower quality drectors over time. In a recent example, 
Warren Buffet retired from the board of Coca-Cola citing time constraints (AP, 2006). 
The factors I consider in the first three hypotheses are factors that have been frequently 
used in the governance literature to predict increased board independence. For example, it 
is often argued that increases in the number of outside directors will improve the 
independence and functioning of the board. However, this might also signal to directors 
that their role has changed and they are expected to expend additional effort. Outsider 
dominated boards may signal to directors that they will be expected to put extra time into 
their board duties. Because directors with high levels of human and social capital have 
the most experience and the best reputations, they will have more options and therefore 
these boards will be less attractive. A greater propo tion of outside directors may also be 
a signal that this board has relatively strong norms of involvement and any new director 
will be expected to work hard and contribute. For the most experienced and connected 
directors this high level commitment of time and effort should be less appealing. During 
my interviews with directors it was clear that they perceived the outsider ratio as a strong 
signal that more was expected of them. As a directo with high levels of human and 
social capital goes about deciding how to maximize their subjective expected utility, they 
will be less interested in boards that require greater investments of time and energy. 
This leads to the first hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1a: Increases in the proportion of outside directors at t1 will be 
negatively related to the overall human capital of the board at t2. 
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Hypothesis 1b: Increases in the proportion of outside directors at t1 will be 
negatively related to the overall social capital of the board at t2. 
Similar arguments can be made about the levels of blockholder and institutional 
ownership. Agency theorists often argue that blockhlders and institutions provide 
additional monitoring of managers (Sanders & Boivie, 2004). However, they may also 
signal to directors that they will be under greater sc utiny from very interested third 
parties (Black, 1992; Burkart, Gromb, & Panunzi, 1997; Tihanyi et al., 2003). Directors 
may be wary of accepting board positions when the companies have large and powerful 
shareholders watching their every move. In addition t  higher expectations about 
involvement, larger proportions of blockholder and i stitutional ownership may involve a 
loss of autonomy for directors. This may signal to directors that they will be monitored, 
just as they should be monitoring executives. People are generally averse to direct, 
regular monitoring of their behavior (McNamara, Moon, & Bromiley, 2002), especially if 
they are accustomed to a high degree of autonomy in their work. In addition directors 
often don’t trust institutions or blockholders to monitor well (Barnard, 1991; Taylor, 
1990). They are used to having a lot of autonomy, and they generally believe that they are 
more knowledgeable about the firm than outsiders (Taylor, 1990). 
This leads to the second and third hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2a: Increases in the level of blockholder ownership at t1 will be 
negatively related to the human capital of the board t t2. 
Hypothesis 2b: Increases in the level of blockholder ownership at t1 will be 
negatively related to the social capital of the board t t2. 
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Hypothesis 3a: Increases in the level of institutional ownership at t1 will be 
negatively related to the human capital of the board t t2.  
Hypothesis 3b: Increases in the level of institutional ownership at t1 will be 
negatively related to the social capital of the board t t2.  
In addition, factors that increase the risks of being a director, such as lawsuits or 
fewer director protections against liability, should make it more difficult to attract and 
retain directors with high levels of human and social apital. The threat of being sued and 
possibly facing large personal liability is very real and should make directors wary of 
accepting board positions at firms that have been su d recently (Cox, 2002). In the past, 
the actual risk of a financial loss was quite low (Black, Cheffins, & Klausner, 2005). 
However, despite the fact that an actual financial loss was quite low, the availability 
heuristic suggests that in an expected utility calcul tion directors will overweight the 
likelihood of the risk due to its salience (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The tendency of 
directors to overestimate the risk of liability is also supported by some recent survey 
evidence that found that outside directors believed that out-of-pocket liability occurred in 
about 5 percent of all shareholder suits, even thoug  the actual number was much less 
than 1 percent (Klausner, Munger, Munger, Black, & Cheffins, 2005).  
These lawsuits and horror stories are also very salient to directors. The directors I 
talked to are very aware of recent lawsuits against the big companies. Moreover, while 
the actual risk of financial loss may have been low in the past, that risk is increasing due 
to recent events. The recent decisions regarding the Worldcom and Enron directors are 
the largest out-of-pocket payments by directors in US history (Klausner et al., 2005; 
Masters & Day, 2005). The former directors of Worldcom and Enron agreed to pay out 
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$31 million dollars out of their own pockets in addition to $36 million being paid out by 
their liability insurance. In addition, even if a shareholder lawsuit is never successfully 
prosecuted, there are still costs to directors in terms of time and money spent defending 
the suit. Finally, even if a director never suffers financially from a shareholder lawsuit, 
there are still real risks to a director’s reputation. The directors at Tyco did not suffer out-
of-pocket financial losses, but no one would argue that they did not have a major loss to 
their reputations. Directors with high levels of human and social capital have the most to 
lose in terms of reputation, and thus will be the most careful to minimize these risks. 
Therefore I predict: 
Hypothesis 4a: Lawsuits by shareholders in the prior year will be negatively 
related to the human capital of the board at t2. 
Hypothesis 4b: Lawsuits by shareholders in the prior year will be negatively 
related to the social capital of the board at t2. 
Corporate governance provisions that indemnify and protect directors against 
liability, as well as against the loss of their positi n should make the position more 
appealing. Corporations can adopt governance provisions that provide directors with 
legal liability in the face of shareholder suits (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003). In 
addition, firms can adopt governance provisions that provide for the compensation of the 
directors if they were to lose their seat due to an acquisition or other external event 
(Gompers et al., 2003). Firms can better compete for the directors with the highest levels 
of human and social capital if they offer these provisi ns, and those without these 




Hypothesis 5a: More director protections at t1 will be positively related to the 
overall human capital of the board at t2. 
Hypothesis 5b: More director protections at t1 will be positively related to the 
overall social capital of the board at t2. 
Finally, protective provisions that help protect directors against liability, should 
moderate the negative risk from recent lawsuits. Firms with protective provisions should 
appear less risky in the presence of lawsuits than firms without such provisions. Directors 
with high levels of human and social capital should feel less threatened by lawsuits when 
these provisions are present. Therefore for my final hypothesis I predict: 
Hypothesis 6a: Director protections will moderate the negative effect of 
shareholder lawsuits on the overall human capital of the board. 
Hypothesis 6b: Director protections will moderate the negative effect of 
shareholder lawsuits on the overall social capital of the board. 
Together, these hypotheses argue for a contrarian’s view of proposed governance 
and agency reforms, by theorizing how they might lead to boards filled with individuals 
who have less human and social capital.  
Research Methodology 
PRELIMINARY INTERVIEWS  
During the development of this study, I conducted preliminary interviews with 
seven board members and also with one institutional investor. The purpose of these 
interviews was to inform the theoretical ideas of this study and to see whether these ideas 
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were present in the minds and thoughts of practicing directors. These discussions helped 
provide valuable insight while I was shaping my hypotheses. I conducted the interviews 
in a semi-structured format. I asked the individuals questions regarding their thoughts 
regarding director effectiveness and current trends and developments in the corporate 
governance landscape. The directors were told that I was studying board effectiveness, 
and that I was looking for insight from practicing directors. After each interview I 
transcribed my written notes. I have used quotes from these interviews throughout the 
text to provide illustration and richness to the thoretical discussion. 
SAMPLE AND DATA COLLECTION  
The theory generated in this dissertation is interest d in the board of directors of 
large public companies, and the issues arising in the effective governance of those 
companies. Therefore, in order to test these hypotheses I will study large public 
companies. I have chosen to study large firms for several reasons. First, most of the 
theorizing and empirical research regarding boards of directors has been conducted on 
large firms. By conducting this study using a similar sample, I enhance the comparability 
of my findings with those of prior research. Second, archival data on director 
characteristics is only available on mid-to large sized firms. Consequently, the 
conclusions of this study are only applicable to large firms. I use “intertypical” sampling 
in this study, by selecting firms across multiple industries rather than examining a group 
of firms within a single industry (Kimberly, 1976). Intertypical sampling allows my 
results to be more generalizable across different firms and industries. This study uses 
archival data on firms in the Fortune 1000. The Fortune 1000 is a yearly list of the largest 
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1000 firms in the US economy. I selected a random sa ple of 650 of the firms that were 
members of the Fortune 1000.  
In order to test the hypotheses presented in this sudy, I collected archival data on 
each firm selected above over three years. My independent variables were measured from 
2001-2003 and my dependent variables were measured from 2002-2004. The hypotheses 
in this study are explicitly concerned with how changes in a prior year will affect the 
composition of a firm’s board in subsequent years. Therefore, a longitudinal design using 
a panel data set is appropriate.  
The archival data for this study was collected from a number of sources. Data on 
firm sales and performance was collected from COMPUSTAT. Data on firm 
diversification was collected from the COMPUSTAT segment database. Information on 
compensation both as executives and directors was collected from the COMPUSTAT 
EXECUCOMP database and from firm proxy statements. Information on director 
attributes was collected from the Corporate Library, the Who’s Who Directory of 
Corporate America, Standard and Poor’s Register of Corporations, Directors and 
Executives, and company proxy statements. Information on firm’s foreign locations was 
collected from the Directory of Corporate Affiliations. 
MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES  
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables are board human and social capital. I measured five 
indicators of human capital and three indicators of ocial capital. The measures of human 
capital are education level, total top management experience, average performance of 
109 
director’s home company, firm tenure, and strategic relatedness of director’s board 
appointments. For education level, total top management experience, and firm tenure, the 
measures of human capital were calculated for each board member and then summed to 
come up with a total level on the board. Conceptually, human and social capital are 
similar to other types of capital in that the overall level is important, so using sums is 
appropriate. However, as a robustness check, I did run models where I used the averages 
and my results were unchanged. Obviously, because the composite scores contain sums, 
the size of the board could over-inflate the levels of human and social capital, but in all of 
my models I control for board size. For the other measures of human capital, the score 
will be calculated for each board member and then averaged to come up with an average 
level on the board. For these measures, it is unclear what a sum of performance or 
relatedness would mean, so using an average is better. 
Education level was measured as the number of years of schooling (Kosnik, 1987; 
Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Education level is a very common indicator of human capital 
(Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Pennings et al., 1998; Wiersema & 
Bantel, 1992). The reason that increased formal education is a useful indicator of human 
capital is because it helps individuals develop more effective ways of learning and 
processing information. Formal education promotes meaningful versus rote learning of 
information (Singley & Anderson, 1989). Formal education also shapes individual’s 
mental models, and teaches people cognitive short-cuts (Hitt & Tyler, 1991). Higher 
levels of TMT education have been associated with bot  greater firm innovation (Bantel 
& Jackson, 1989; Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981) and greater organizational change 
(Wiersema & Bantel, 1992).  
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Total management experience was measured by examining the number of years 
each individual has served as a top executive (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). Managerial 
skill is complex, rare, and difficult to acquire (Castanias & Helfat, 1991; Pennings et al., 
1998). Experience is one way someone can move from being a novice to being an expert 
(Chi et al., 1982). Experience allows the transfer of tacit knowledge (Singley & 
Anderson, 1989) that may be difficult to acquire simply through education or reading. As 
tacit knowledge is acquired, individuals are better able to build knowledge structures that 
promote more powerful search heuristics (Chi et al., 1982). Experience also helps 
individuals see commonalities between situations and develop principle-centered 
knowledge structures (Loewenstein et al., 1999). These knowledge structures enhance 
future problem solving by helping experts solve problems more quickly, and by 
facilitating individual ability to focus on relevant information cues (Singley & Anderson, 
1989). By helping individuals become experts in managerial decision-making, prior 
managerial experience is directly related to greate expertise and skill (Pfeffer & Davis-
Blake, 1986). 
Performance of directors’ home companies was calculated by using the industry-
indexed return on equity assets of the company where the director is also an executive for 
the prior year. Non-executive outside directors were xcluded from this measure. 
Although firm performance is affected by numerous factors, studies have shown that top 
executives characteristics and decisions also influe ce firm performance (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Directors who come from companies with 
high levels of performance should be better able to valuate the actions of the focal firm’s 
management. If superior management skills are rare and difficult to acquire (Castanias & 
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Helfat, 1991), then these skills should lead to higher firm performance. 
Firm tenure is the number of years the individual has served as a director at the 
focal firm. Firm tenure is a proxy for firm-specifi human capital (Buchholtz et al., 
2003). The longer a director has served on the board f a firm, the more that director will 
know about the company and the greater will be that director’s expertise. 
Following Carpenter and Westphal (2001) I measure the relatedness of board 
members’ other appointments along four dimensions: product market, foreign market, 
diversification, and degree of internationalization. Directors rely on schema driven 
knowledge structures for decision-making, and these schema are heavily influenced by 
directors’ prior experience (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). Experience in strategically 
similar companies should help build knowledge structures that are relevant to the types of 
problems likely to be confronted by the focal firm (Haunschild, 1993; Useem, 1982). 
When determining whether a director is associated with firms that are 
strategically related to the focal firm it is important to look upon strategic dimensions that 
are widely held as being important. Product market similarity was measured by 
examining the number of board appointments that share the same primary SIC code as 
the focal firm and then dividing that by the total number of board appointments.  
Foreign market similarity was measured by counting he number of appointments 
the director has to firms that share a primary foreign market, and then normalizing this by 
the total number of appointments. For example, if a director served on the board of two 
firms that report their primary foreign market as the UK then that director’s appointments 
would show a high degree of similarity. 
To examine the extent to which the director’s board ppointments are similar in 
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their diversification profile, I use an entropy-based diversification index (Palepu, 1985). 
The diversification score is calculated as Σ Pi ln (1 / Pi), where Pi equals the percentage of 
sales a firm received from its ith 6-digit NAICS segment. I then calculated the absolute 
difference between the diversification score of the focal firm and the diversification score 
of each of the firms with which the director is affiliated. I then add the scores and 
normalize them by the number of total appointments. It is important to average these 
scores in order to avoid inflating the overall similarity of a director with many board 
appointments that are somewhat similar. For instance, if a director had affiliations with 
10 other firms that were each similar by .1 this would appear equally similar to a director 
that has affiliations with 2 other firms that are each similar by .5. By averaging these 
scores the true level of similarity in director appointments is represented more accurately. 
This value was then subtracted from the highest value of diversification dissimilarity in 
order to create an index of relatedness. While there is not universal agreement (Allison, 
1990), I must note that some researchers have argued that using difference scores is 
problematic (Cronbach & Furby, 1970; Edwards, 1994). Therefore, in order to be 
thorough each time a difference score is used I ran additional analyses to make sure the 
difference scores used satisfied the constraints outlined by Edwards (1994). I followed 
the procedure outlined by Edwards (1994) and subsequently used in other research 
(Milton & Westphal, 2005)and each of the measures used satisfied all four constraints 
specified by Edwards. I also ran analyses where I used the constrained and unconstrained 
equations and my results were unchanged, which indicates that using a difference score is 
appropriate for this analysis. 
To measure the extent to which directors serve on bards that have similar 
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degrees of internationalization, I used a modified v rsion of Sullivan’s (1994) composite 
measure of the degree of internationalization (DOI) (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). The 
DOI measure examines separate but distinct areas of internationalization. The DOI 
measure usually has three components, but because of issues regarding data availability I 
was only able to use two of the three components. The first characteristic it examines is 
foreign sales. The level of foreign sales is calculated as the ratio of foreign sales to total 
sales. This characteristic reflects how much a firmdepends on sales to foreign markets. 
The other measure is geographic dispersion, and this is measured by examining the 
number of country subsidiaries as a percentage of the total number of country 
subsidiaries represented in the sample. Each of these characteristics can range from 0 to 
1, and the DOI is calculated by summing the measures. Prior research has shown that 
these measures have high inter-item reliability and load on one factor (Carpenter & 
Westphal, 2001; Sullivan, 1994) except when the firms studied are extremely young 
(Carpenter et al., 2003). However, although the firms in this sample are large and well-
established, I tested the reliability of this index in my own sample and also ran factor 
loadings to make sure that this measure demonstrate a r liable single-factor loading. The 
reliability coefficient was 0.81 which is acceptable, and there was a clear single factor 
loading for both areas of internationalization with each item loading equally at 0.77. I 
calculated the relatedness of this measure by subtracting the absolute difference between 
the focal firm and the other firm’s with which a director is affiliated and then averaging 
this score. This value was then subtracted from the highest value of DOI dissimilarity in 
order to create an index of relatedness.  
The measures of social capital are total board ties, performance of interlocks, and 
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social club memberships.  
Total board ties was measured by examining the total number of other firms that 
the focal firm is connected to through director interlocks (Davis, 1991; Finkelstein, 1992; 
Haunschild, 1994). I excluded duplicate connections—so this measure effectively 
captures the firm’s degree centrality in the board interlock network.. Being highly 
connected may give directors access to information that leads to more innovative ideas 
for the focal firm (Powell et al., 1996; Rogers, 1995). Highly connected directors may 
also be more able to get information that is unique or difficult to transfer (Uzzi, 1997). 
The number of directorships an individual has is a measure of director power because it 
allows a director to absorb uncertainty in the institutional environment (Finkelstein, 
1992). Total board ties are also an indicator of a firm’s centrality within the network of 
interlocked firms (Gulati et al., 2000). 
Performance of interlocks was measured using the average industry-indexed 
performance of the firms that the director is tied to. This will then be averaged across all 
directors (Finkelstein, 1992). When the companies that a director is connected with do 
well, that should increase his/her prestige and reputation (Fama, 1980; Finkelstein, 1992). 
It should also be an indicator, although indirectly, of that director’s access to useful or 
quality information. Being a director of a high performing company should also indicate 
that the director understands effective board processes and is associated with companies 
that are making good decisions. The more a director is exposed to these kinds of 
activities, the better he or she should be able to use that information in the focal firm. 
Social club membership was measured using the total number of memberships to 
exclusive social clubs listed in the Social Register (Belliveau et al., 1996; Palmer & 
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Barber, 2001). This measure did not exclude duplicate ties to social clubs, because it is 
important to understand how prestigious the firm’s individual directors are as a group, 
rather than just the total number of social clubs that the board would have access to. 
Literature on corporate elites argues that the most prominent corporate directors form an 
elite group in society that has a tremendous amount f power and influence (Zeitlin, 
1974). Social club membership has been used in the past as an indicator of the status 
aspect of social capital (Belliveau et al., 1996). Having prestigious directors may help the 
firm gain access to financial resources in times of tr uble (Domhoff, 1983; Uzzi, 1999). 
In addition, high-status directors may be able to directly or indirectly influence legislation 
that affects the firm (Domhoff, 1983; Useem, 1982). 
Human and social capital are stocks of resources that are embedded or tied to 
individuals, and are composed of multiple factors. They are not latent variables, like 
personality or motivation, which are measured by using indirect indicators and then 
assuming the presence of an unmeasured but real factor. Instead, they are pools of 
resources available to individuals that can be measur d using composite indicators. 
Therefore in my analyses I will model the constructs of human and social capital by 
measuring multiple indicators and then combining these indicators using summed z-
scores and using the generated total score in the regr ssion equations. For the purpose of 
this study, summing the data using z-scores is simply a data reduction technique used to 
aggregate my constructs and to facilitate the analysis of multiple indicators. I have chosen 
to use summed z-scores for a couple of reasons. Factor nalysis techniques combine 
indicators by examining the level of shared variance between measures, and then by 
creating a composite variable using weightings based on that shared variance. However, 
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conceptually human and social capital may be indicated by different measures that are 
not likely to be correlated, such as education and experience where there is a direct trade 
off between the two. So, using a factor analytic approach is not appropriate. One potential 
limitation of using a summed z-score is that it assumes an equal weight for each indicator 
of human or social capital. While I do not believe that each measure of human and social 
capital necessarily has an equal impact on an individual’s overall level of human and 
social capital, extant theory does not suggest an altern tive weighting scheme a priori. In 
addition, research has shown that equal weighting of indicators may produce regression 
results that are very similar to more sophisticated w ightings (Lawshe & Schucker, 1959; 
Schmidt & Kaplan, 1971; Stanley & Wang, 1970). In fact, in some cases simple unit 
weighting as is done here provides superior estimates than does a regression weighting of 
composite measures (Schmidt, 1971). 
Independent Variables 
Proportion of outsiders on board was measured as a ratio of outside to inside 
directors. Directors are classified as being outside if they are not employed by the firm. 
Having a high proportion of outsiders on the board is one of the most commonly used 
measures of board independence (Dalton et al., 1998; Kosnik, 1987).   
Blockholder ownership was measured as the percentage of company stock owned 
by parties with at least a five percent stake in the company, who are not officers or 
directors and who have no business ties to the firm (Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993). The 
data on this variable came from multiple sources including proxy statements and other 
databases. At times the data in the proxy statements was ambiguous about the exact 
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nature of the ownership of shares. Because of this,at times I was forced to make 
judgment calls about the level of blockholder ownership. Whenever this occurred, I 
coded a dummy variable for estimating the level and I i clude that dummy variable in all 
models. 
I measure institutional ownership as the total percentage of company stock owned 
by institutional investors like pension or mutual funds (Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993).  
Shareholder lawsuits were measured as the total number of lawsuits filed by 
shareholders of public companies in the prior year. I gathered this data from Institutional 
Shareholder Services. Shareholder lawsuits are a direct measure of legal risk that 
directors face. In order to ensure robustness I ranmodels measuring this in two different 
ways. I first measured all lawsuits filed by shareholders in the prior year and entered this 
number into my models. All models reported use thisfigure. For robustness I also ran 
models that included a sum of all lawsuits over the prior 6 years and my results were 
unchanged. I would have liked to measure the size or magnitude of the lawsuits, but a 
large proportion of these suits are settled and so information on size was unavailable.  
Director protections were measured as the number of corporate governance 
provisions the company has adopted that protect directo s from liability or other types of 
loss. This data comes from the Investor Responsibility Research Center which tracks 
detailed information on corporate governance provisi ns adopted by firms. I included all 
of the protections that the IRRC classifies as director protection policies as well as four 
others, specifically: blank check, classified board, non-financial duties of directors, and 
poison pills. These four additional policies should be appealing to potential directors 
because they give the board more power relative to shareholders. The director protections 
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category contains six provisions that are “designed to insure officers and directors against 
job-related liability or to compensate them following a termination” (Gompers et al., 
2003 p. 111). The six provisions are: (1) compensation plans that allow directors to 
accelerate option payout in the event of a change of ownership; (2) indemnification 
contracts that protect a director from expenses occurred from lawsuits pertaining to their 
conduct; (3) golden parachutes that provide compensation upon termination due to a 
merger or acquisition; (4) indemnification bylaws or charters that are similar to the 
contracts listed in part (2) but apply to the entire board; (5) charter or bylaw limitations 
on directors’ personal liability for breaches of the duty of care (to the extent of state law); 
and (6) severance agreements that provide compensatio  in case of termination but that 
are not contingent upon a change of ownership like golden parachutes (Gompers et al., 
2003). The protections variable is constructed by adding one point for every provision 
that is present at the focal firm. This does not calcul te the weight or impact of any one 
provision, but it does show how many different provisions a company has adopted. Firms 
that have fewer protections for directors should be more risky, and should be less 
appealing to directors with high levels of human and social capital who have more 
potential options for appointments. The IRRC database does not measure director 
protections every year, so the prior year’s protection variable is carried forward until the 
database is updated. In about 5 or 6 cases a firm was not entered into the IRRC database 
until after the initial observation window. In these cases, the IRRC data was coded as the 
backfilled based on the first year for which data is available and a dummy variable was 
coded based on this procedure. I subsequently include this dummy variable in all of the 
models to control for any bias introduced due to the estimation of data. 
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Control Variables 
In all of my models I control for the prior level of human or social capital on the 
board using an instrumental variable to control forthe problem of autoregression 
(Haveman, 1993). Because this study is about how changes in the costs of being a 
director will affect directors’ willingness to serve on boards, it is important to also 
consider the benefits. Therefore in all of my models I control for the compensation of 
directors in three different ways. Average total director compensation was measured as 
the total annual compensation package of a director including annual retainer, meeting 
fees, and stock option grants. The data on director ompensation is not as uniformly 
presented as the data on executive compensation. In some cases, the number of options 
granted (or the value) was ambiguous. In these cases, I calculated the value of the options 
based on the information present in the proxy statement, and I coded a dummy variable to 
indicate the ambiguity. I subsequently include thisdummy variable in all of the models to 
control for any bias introduced due to any estimation of data. Percentage of contingent 
compensation, was measured as the proportion of total director ompensation granted in 
long-term or contingent forms such as stock options (Zajac & Westphal, 1994). This 
measure was then averaged across all of the directors on the board. For stock options, I 
used the Black-Scholes method of valuation (Zajac & Westphal, 1994). The Black-
Scholes method is the most widely used, and prior research has shown that it is highly 
correlated with the SEC valuation method and usually gives similar results when used in 
analysis (Sanders, 2001). Level of firm ownership by directors was measured as the 
percentage of company stock owned by the directors of the firm (Sanders & Boivie, 
2004). This measure was then divided by the number of total directors on the board to get 
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the average level of ownership by each outside directo . This also controls for those 
directors who are also blockholders of the firm.  
The attractiveness of a firm to directors may be highly influenced by prior firm 
performance. In order to control for that effect, I plan to include prior firm ROA in the 
models. Theory has shown that firm size may affect firm performance (Kimberly, 1976). 
Firm size may also affect the board’s ability to influence firm outcomes. Because firm 
sales are usually highly skewed, firm size was measur d using the log of sales. Logging 
this variable should allow it to more accurately reflect the assumptions of normality 
present within regression models. Level of unrelated diversification was calculated using 
an entropy index of unrelated diversification (Davis & Duhaime, 1989; Palepu, 1985). 
The diversification score is calculated as Σ Pi ln (1 / Pi), where Pi equals the percentage of 
sales a firm received from its ith 2-digit SIC segment that is outside its primary industry. 
This index weights the level of involvement in each area that is unrelated to the primary 
business of the firm. Firms that have high levels of unrelated diversification will require 
more preparation time and effort to understand, and place a greater information 
processing load on directors (Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996) and should therefore be 
less appealing to work for.  
The size of the board may affect how well the group f nctions (Ancona & 
Caldwell, 1992). Board size is simply the total number of directors on the focal firm’s 
board of directors. CEO contingent compensation may affect the level of monitoring 
necessary by the board (Westphal, 1999). Therefore I plan to control for the level of a 
CEO’s pay that is paid in long-term forms. This was measured similar to the above 
description of how board contingent compensation was measured. Appointments after the 
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CEO can affect the power of directors and their ability to contribute to board meetings 
(Westphal & Zajac, 1995). Therefore, I will control f r the number of directors that were 
appointed after the current CEO took office. Leadership structure can also affect the 
distribution of power between the CEO and the board (Westphal & Zajac, 1995) 
therefore, I plan to control for whether the CEO is al o the chairman of the board. This 
was coded as a dummy variable, where a one indicates the positions are held by the same 
individual. The diversity of the board may affect the functioning of the team (Hambrick 
et al., 1996; Knight et al., 1999; Pelled et al., 1999). To control for this I calculated a 
heterogeneity measure based on the div rsity of director’s ages.  
Estimation Methods 
ANALYSIS  
In this study both my dependent and independent variables are continuous in 
nature and are measured over time. This results in a cross-sectional panel data set. Cross-
sectional panel data can be tested using pooled time-series analyses. These analyses allow 
use of the full sample, and reflect the average effct of the independent variables over the 
full study, thereby giving more accurate estimates than cross-sectional sub-samples.  
Because the data set contains pooled observations, here is a lack of independence 
among observations which violates the assumptions of OLS and subsequently OLS will 
produce biased estimates. I therefore used generaliz d east squares (GLS). GLS is 
designed for analyzing longitudinal data that is continuous in nature and is especially 
good at handling the problem of autocorrelation that occurs with longitudinal models. 
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GLS corrects for autocorrelation across panels by generating an autocorrelation 
coefficient. In addition, I was able to run panel-specific autocorrelation coefficients. 
What this does is the models generate a separate auto-correlation coefficient for each 
panel (firm) in the data set. The end result is a model that controls for firm-specific 
correlation across time and does a better job of controlling for autocorrelation than a 
simple pooled autocorrelation coefficient. All models reported use the panel-specific 
autocorrelation. Although, for robustness, I also ran models using the pooled 
autocorrelation coefficient and I get substantively similar results. One limitation of GLS 
is that it does not allow me to run random or fixed effects models. However, for this 
study, random effects models are not appropriate because they assume that the subject 
effects are completely uncorrelated with the predictors, which is unlikely here. In order to 
simulate fixed effects models, I ran models where I mean-deviated each variable in the 
regression equation. This procedure simulates fixed-effects models. The results were not 
substantively different, so I report the simpler models.  
 Results 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the variables in this study. Some of the 
predictors are significantly correlated to ensure that multicollinearity was not a problem. I 
assessed my models using matrix decomposition techniques, as recommended by Judge 
et al. (1988: 870). In all of the models the highest condition index was 17, well under the 
highly conservative upper limit of 20 recommended by Belsley (1991), which strongly 
indicates that collinearity did not affect the hypothesis tests. In addition, in order to better 
understand my results presented below, I also ran models where I separated the individual 
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components of the human and social capital composites, and ran the models with each 
component as a separate dependent variable. For social capital, each of the three 
individual components had similar results on all of the independent variables. Therefore, 
it appears that no one component of social capital has a disproportionate impact on the 
overall results. For human capital, however, some of the individual measures had results 
that strongly mirror the results with the composite measure, while other individual 
measures had results that were slightly different. Prior top management experience, 
overall board tenure, the performance of director’s home companies, and the degree to 
which directors board appointments are related on the degree of foreignness all produced 
results that mirror the results of the composite measure. When director education and the 
other relatedness measures are run separately, the hypothesized effects are less 
significant. What this means is that the results presented below using a composite 
measure of human capital are most strongly influenced by prior top management 
experience, overall board tenure, the performance of director’s home companies, and the 
degree to which directors board appointments are related on the degree of foreignness.  
HYPOTHESIS TESTS 
Table 5 lists the results for the GLS analyses. Thedependent variable of human 
capital was used in one set of models, and social capital was used in a separate set of 
models. For human capital, Model 1 contains the control variables, Model 2 adds the 
hypothesized main effects, and Model 3 further adds the hypothesized interaction of 
director protections and shareholder lawsuits. For social capital, Model 4 contains the 
control variables, Model 5, adds the main effects, and Model 6 adds the interaction. 
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Hypothesis 1a predicted that the proportion of outsider  at t1 would lead to lower 
levels of human capital at t2. As Model 2 shows this ypothesis was supported. The 
coefficient of -4.466 was negative and significant (p<.001). Hypothesis 1b predicted that 
the proportion of outsiders at t1 would lead to lower levels of social capital at t2. This 
hypothesis was also supported. The coefficient of -3.407 was negative and significant 
(p<.001). 
Hypothesis 2a predicted that the level of blockholder ownership at t1 would lead 
to lower levels of human capital at t2. As Model 2 shows, this hypothesis was supported. 
The coefficient of -0.815 was negative and significant (p<.01). Hypothesis 2b predicted 
that the level of blockholder ownership at t1 would lead to lower levels of social capital 
at t2. As Model 5 shows there is only marginal support for this hypothesis. The 
coefficient of -0.560 is negative and marginally significant (p<.10). 
Hypothesis 3a predicted that the level of institutional ownership at t1 would lead 
to lower levels of human capital at t2. As Model 2 shows, this hypothesis was not 
supported. The coefficient of -0.052 is in the predicted direction but is not significant. 
Hypothesis 3b predicted that the level of institutional ownership at t1 would lead to lower 
levels of social capital at t2. As Model 5 shows, this hypothesis was not supported. The 
coefficient was negative but not significant. 
Hypothesis 4a predicted that the number of sharehold r lawsuits in the prior year 
would lead to lower levels of human capital at t2. As Model 2 shows, the main effect was 
not significant by itself, but as Model 3 shows, it becomes significant in the presence of 
the interaction. Because the significance changes based on the presence of the interaction, 
I will only interpret the result of the interactive model. Hypothesis 4b predicted that the 
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number of shareholder lawsuits in the prior year would lead to lower levels of social 
capital at t2. As Model 5 shows, this hypothesis wa not supported. The coefficient is in 
the opposite direction than predicted and is significant (p<.05).  
Hypothesis 5a predicted that the number of director pr tections at t1 would lead 
to lower levels of human capital at t2. As Model 2 shows, the main effect was significant 
and the hypothesis was supported, however, as with H4a, the significance changes based 
on the presence of the interaction. Hypothesis 5b predicted that the number of director 
protections at t1 would lead to lower levels of social apital at t2. As Model 5 shows, this 
hypothesis was not supported. The coefficient is in the direction predicted, but is not 
significant. 
Hypothesis 6a predicted that the number of director pr tections would moderate 
the negative effect of shareholder lawsuits on the lev ls of human capital at t2. As Model 
3 shows, this hypothesis was supported. The coefficient of 0.237 was positive and 
significant (p<.05). I will discuss this result further below. Hypothesis 6b predicted that 
the number of director protections would moderate th  negative effect of shareholder 
lawsuits on the levels of social capital at t2. As Model 6 shows, this hypothesis was not 
supported. The coefficient was not in the predicted direction and was not significant.  
Because adding the interaction of director protections and shareholder lawsuits 
changes the significance of the variables in the model, it is only appropriate to interpret 
their effects in the presence of the interaction. In Model 3, the coefficient of shareholder 
lawsuits was negative and significant (p<.05) and the coefficient of director protections 
was positive and marginally significant (p<.10), and the interaction coefficient was 
positive and significant (p<.05). Figure 8 uses the co fficients from Model 3 to graph the 
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interactive effect sizes of director protections and shareholder lawsuits on board-level 
human capital. The y axis on Figure 8 indicates the change in the overall level of the 
human capital variable based on changes in the predictor variables. For changes in 
director protections, fewer protections is equal to µ - σ, where µ and σ are the mean and 
standard deviation of director protections; more protections is equal to µ + σ. Because 
shareholder lawsuits is a count variable I used 0 and more than one. I tested and the 
difference between more and fewer protections with no lawsuits in the prior year is 
marginally significant (p<0.10), but the difference b tween more and fewer protections 
with one or more lawsuits is significant (p<0.01). What this means is that when the firm 
has had no lawsuits in the prior year there is no difference between having fewer director 
protections (measured as 1 sd below the mean) and more director protections (measured 
as 1 sd above the mean) on the level of human capital on the board. However, in the 
presence of one or more lawsuits, having more directo  protections is extremely valuable. 
In fact, rather than simply limiting a negative impact of lawsuits, it actually appears to 
increase a firm’s level of human capital on the board.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
The findings of this study extend prior research on c rporate governance and 
boards of directors in three important ways. First, I theorized and found support for the 
idea that actively working to increase the structural independence of the board may 
actually lower the human and social capital of the board. This extends theory on 
corporate governance by demonstrating that firms that attempt to apply agency theory 
prescriptions in isolation may suffer from unintendd results. Second, I argued and found 
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that certain factors that may increase the workload, scrutiny, and risk that directors are 
under may lead to lower aggregate human capital of the board. This extends theory on 
corporate governance by drawing on a human resource perspective of corporate leaders to 
show that a consideration of director’s interests is important to understanding the 
consequences of corporate governance practices. Finally, I hypothesized and found that 
the negative effect of shareholder lawsuits may be moderated by greater director 
protections. This extends theory on corporate governance by demonstrating that although 
directors express concerns about the risks of serving on boards, the practical effects of 
such risks can be alleviated through the use of specific corporate policies.  
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEORY  
 The theory developed here makes a contribution to research on corporate 
governance by exploring some of the unintended consequences of normative corporate 
governance prescriptions when these prescriptions are implemented by firms. I found 
support for the prediction that a greater proportion of outsiders on the board would lead 
to lower levels of human and social capital. This finding supports my argument that 
actively working to increase board independence may h ve side effects that are not 
considered by traditional work that uses normative ag ncy theory and/or board power 
perspectives. This paper explicitly considers one such side effect, lower levels of human 
and social capital on boards. Directors are not immune to increasing workloads, 
pressures, and risk, and may react to these factors by limiting the availability of their 
services. This should be especially true of the most qualified directors who have the most 
options, and also the most to lose. Prior research on corporate governance often implicitly 
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assumes that changes to the corporate governance profile of a firm through increased 
independence, and other proposed reforms will only have one effect, that of improving 
monitoring. However, this research has failed to consider how governance reforms will 
affect the interests of directors. This is a major oversight. Without considering the effects 
of corporate governance reforms on the actors who are expected to implement them, 
these models are likely to generate very different results in practice than they do in 
theory.  
 Structural independence was the only hypothesized factor that had a negative 
impact on both the human and social capital of the board. One potential explanation for 
this result is that the outsider ratio of the board is the single most salient characteristic of 
a board of directors. Board independence is the chara teristic that is most widely 
discussed in the media and among institutional players. This also means that it should be 
the characteristic that is most likely to be noticed and considered by directors when 
considering a board appointment. It is also interesing to consider another potential 
impact of the outsider ratio. Directors expressed a desire to serve because of the potential 
learning benefits. More outsiders on the board may provide a greater learning opportunity 
for directors because they will be in contact with a more diverse group of directors. This 
would lead to more outsiders on the board being a positive signal to new director 
candidates. However, based on the results presented her , even if directors perceive some 
learning benefit from having more outsiders on the board, the negative signal of increased 
workload appears to outweigh any positive signals. 
 It must be noted, that in general, the results in this study are much stronger when 
human capital is used as the dependent variable compared with when social capital is the 
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dependent variable. The only hypothesis that is supported with regards to lower social 
capital is the proportion of outsiders on the board. Social capital is a difficult construct to 
measure accurately, and some of the weakness of theresults may be due to inaccuracy in 
the measure. Directors with high levels of social capital may feel that they have more 
power and influence, and therefore may feel more immune to the effect of lawsuits, or 
less obligated to follow the norms on any particular board. Therefore, indicators of 
increased workload, risk, or scrutiny may be less important to them. In fact, there is 
evidence that directors with many board appointments have more autonomy and face 
weaker social controls (Westphal & Khanna, 2003). In addition, it is interesting to note 
that shareholder lawsuits in the prior year actually increased the level of social capital on 
the board in the next year. This was opposite of what t e hypothesis predicted. If the 
company has been sued, the current board may feel strongly that they need to protect 
themselves. So potentially, firms who have been sued may encourage directors with low 
social capital to leave in order to boost the power and status of the board. In addition, the 
firm may also recruit directors more on the basis of social capital than human capital. 
Because a lawsuit threatens the legitimacy of the firm, the role of directors in bolstering 
firm legitimacy becomes more salient, and firms will ork harder to recruit directors with 
high levels of social capital to bolster that legitimacy. In addition, research suggests that 
managers may vary greatly in how cognizant they are regarding their level of social 
capital (Krackhardt, 1990). Therefore, directors may be less mindful of dangers or risks 
to their social capital.  
Another contribution of this paper is that it uses both agency theory and human 
resource perspectives to explore the phenomenon of boards of directors. Too often 
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theorizing in this area draws from only one perspectiv . In this study I draw upon a 
human resource perspective to argue that firms that place higher workloads and demands 
on directors will find that high quality directors are less willing to sit on their boards. 
This is one of the first empirical studies to adopt a human resource perspective on boards. 
This paper continues the recent trend of interdisciplinary theorizing to examine boards of 
directors and their impact on the firm (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003; Westphal, 1999).  
This paper also makes a contribution by exploring some possible determinants of 
board composition. Most governance research merely examines the effects of the 
composition of the board, while failing to consider the determinants of composition. This 
paper proposes a number of factors that may lead to lower levels of human and social 
capital on boards. 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT PRACTICE  
This paper has clear implications for management practice. The results presented 
here suggest that managers and other institutional actors need to take a hard look at some 
of the proposed fixes to corporate governance problems. If the end result of these fixes is 
lower quality boards, then the problem will still exist, just in a different form or for 
different reasons. If boards end up with very active and independent directors who have 
little management experience and therefore cannot effectively monitor executive action, 
then the agency problem has not properly been addressed. In addition, if increased 
scrutiny and risk make qualified directors unwilling to serve, then the end result is still 
boards that are not as effective as possible. This paper hopes to show that individuals and 
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groups pushing for board reform need to consider multiple aspects of how these proposed 
reforms may affect boards.  
One potential reaction to this paper may be to simply increase the benefits 
associated with being a director, possibly through pay and other perquisites. If the costs 
of being a director are increasing, one way to combat this is to increase the benefits to 
directors, which should counteract the negative downside risks. However, it must be 
noted that in this study higher total compensation was not significantly related to greater 
levels of human or social capital on the board. Greater proportions of option pay and 
higher levels of ownership were related to more human capital on the board. What this 
suggests is that pay in general may not be very helpful in recruiting and retaining 
directors with high levels of human capital, but what is important is how much the 
directors are truly linked to the firm in terms of ownership and contingent pay. However, 
drastically increasing director ownership levels or the proportion of option pay could also 
be impractical both from a public relations perspectiv  as well as financially. Executive 
pay levels are already high and face a large amount f scrutiny. Increasing director 
ownership levels and stock option compensation might be unpalatable to the financial 
press. Another option is to create director compensation packages that are more flexible 
and better structured to the preferences of individual directors. Board compensation is 
currently very uniform across directors, with the only variance coming from additional 
compensation for committee memberships. As evidenced above, directors provide a wide 
array of motivations for serving on boards, so perhaps compensation packages could be 
structured to more fully address this variety.  
Another potential action in response to this paper would be for firms to look for 
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alternative ways to improve their governance practices that reduce the load put on outside 
directors. Directors that I spoke with provided a number of different ideas of their own 
such as a suggestion to give directors their own independent staff in order to help combat 
the information gap between directors and managers. However, the costs and benefits of 
this approach are unknown. The expense of giving directors an independent staff may 
well outweigh any possible benefits.  
Another implication of this research is that boards might need to do a better job of 
promoting the benefits of board service to potential recruits. This study illustrates that the 
costs of board service appear to be salient to directo s. Perhaps nomination committees 
need to do a better job when they are recruiting director candidates of also showing the 
benefits of board service.  
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
There are a number of areas of future research sugge ted by this paper. Future 
research could examine more in depth the motivation of directors for serving. Much of 
the work in this area has not examined empirically why directors choose to serve on 
boards and how that affects their service. In fact, most of the insight into why directors 
choose to serve comes from qualitative discussions with directors. It would be useful to 
have a more systematic examination of director motivations. This paper tests only one set 
of factors that may impact directors’ choices regarding board service. Future research 
could explore a broader range of factors that would both increase and decrease directors 
likelihood of accepting board appointments. One potentially rich area for future research 
would be to directly assess director perceptions about the attractiveness of board service 
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using a large-sample survey. This would provide dirct evidence about how changes in 
certain characteristics of the board are actually impacting director perceptions and their 
subsequent willingness to serve. In fact, one of the limitations of this study is that I did 
not directly measure directors reasons for declining board positions, but that I only 
measured the effect of certain practices on board-level characteristics. 
The background of this study is the changing institutional environment for 
directors. The institutional environment is one of increasing pressure, scrutiny, and risk 
for directors. What this study considers is how this broad general pressure may be 
manifested in various corporate governance practices and what is tested explicitly is how 
differences in these practices across firms affect companies’ ability to recruit and retain 
directors with high levels of human and social capital. This study only indirectly 
considers how increased pressure on directors in the institutional environment might 
influence director quality. Future research could explore the direct effects of changes in 
the institutional environment. For instance, future research could examine changes in the 
institutional environment such as new legislation, court decisions, and the decisions of 
regulatory bodies like the SEC and the stock exchanges directly affect the overall level of 
director quality available in the market. Another area of future research would be to 
explore the moderating effect of changes in the institutional environment on director 
quality. For instance, new legislation and recent court decisions may increase the effect 
of some of the variables in this study. Legislation like the Sarbanes-Oxley act may make 
having an outsider-dominated board, or a high level of blockholder ownership even 
stronger signals to directors about the level of work expected and scrutiny they can 
expect from their board service.  
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This study is one of the few papers that examine det rminants of the composition 
of the board. This is a very rich area for future research. Besides what factors a potential 
director may consider when sitting on a board, researchers should examine what factors 
make a potential director candidate attractive. This study makes the argument that 
directors’ level of human and social capital should be valuable. However, there are other 
aspects of a director’s reputation that may also be important, including directors 
associations with firms who experience highly visible and negative outcomes such as 
earnings restatements (Arthaud-Day et al., Forthcoming). As mentioned above, Fama and 
Jensen (1983) argued that a market for directors exists, but there has been very little 
empirical or theoretical treatment regarding how that market may operate. Future 
research could explore in detail what affects directors’ reputations.  
In addition to the characteristics of directors that le d to their board appointment, 
more research is needed into the actual board appointment process. Most of what we 
understand about how directors are recruited and selected comes from qualitative sources, 
and is dated (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1986). Future research could examine the 
process used by boards to identify director candidates nd also the process then used to 
recruit and retain these candidates.  
One of the limitations of this study is that I did not directly assess the 
performance impact of having lower human and social apital on the board. There is 
evidence in other domains that human capital is useful for individuals (Carpenter & 
Wade, 2002; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990) and can lead to higher firm performance 
(Bruderl et al., 1992; Hitt et al., 2001), but in this study it is merely assumed that having 
lower human and/or social capital on the board willbe potentially negative for the firm. 
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Future research could more directly assess this assumption. It is possible that lower 
human and/or social capital could be overcome by having directors who are more 
motivated and spend more time.  
Another potential limitation of this study is that due to the nature of some of the 
measures it is impossible to rule out some alternative explanations for the results. For 
instance, the negative effect of the outsider ratio on human capital could be the result of 
the fact that boards that add more outsiders may not be as able to be as choosy when 
filling additional outside director slots. So rather than the lower human capital being a 
result of directors conscious choice to avoid the firm, it is instead the result of the firm’s 
inability to find directors who are qualified. In practice, however, this explanation still 
fits the larger purpose of this study which is to show that increases to structural 
independence may not have the effect intended by agency theorists. 
CONCLUSION  
Actions often have consequences that are not intended. Recent actions pushing for 
increased director independence and involvement appear to be no exception. Well 
intentioned researchers and governance activists have pursued an agenda to improve 
corporate governance by creating advocate directors, but they appear to have forgotten 
one important element, the impact of these changes on director attitudes. In addition, 
corporate governance reform appears to suffer from the failure to consider the results of 
current research. Not only may increased board independence have no relationship with 
firm performance (Dalton et al., 1998), it may actually weaken corporate governance in 
general by reducing the overall quality and ability of boards. 
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OVERALL CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this dissertation was to better understand boards of directors. In 
order to do this I first developed a model of board effectiveness that established the 
importance of director capabilities. Specifically, I drew upon the literatures of human and 
social capital to explain how structurally equivalent boards may be quite different in 
terms of their effectiveness. In the second study of this dissertation I decided to focus on 
how factors that increase the workload, scrutiny, and risk of directors influence the 
selection and retention of those capabilities at the board level. Prior literature has 
addressed proposed certain types of board structures, but has failed to consider how these 
changes may affect directors’ interests. By showing that factors such as a greater 
proportion of outsiders and higher levels of blockholder ownership that have been 
proposed to increase the effectiveness of the board m y also increase the costs of being a 
director and therefore lower the level of human andsocial capital on boards, the second 
study of this dissertation reveals that many proposed corporate governance reforms may 
be indirectly harming board effectiveness.  
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Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of Key Variables (N=1,817) for 
Study One 
Variable  Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. ROE 0.06 1.04       
2. Mkt to Book -0.06 71.84 0.00      
3. Director Pay* 11.29 1.04 0.07 -0.03     
4. % Option Pay 0.31 0.31 0.02 0.00 0.43    
5. Dir Ownership 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.13 0.04   
6. Dir Education 139.82 49.65 0.03 -0.01 0.15 -0.13 -0.28  
7. Dir TMT Exp 84.06 45.70 0.04 0.01 0.09 -0.13 -0.25 0.74 
8. Perf. Of Dir Home Companies 0.63 3.45 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.04 
9. Director Tenure 67.02 35.85 0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.10 -0.09 0.58 
10. Product Market Similarity 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.11 -0.01 -0.10 
11. Foreign Market Similarity 0.14 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.00 -0.15 0.18 
12. Diversification Similarity 0.33 0.31 0.00 0.02 -0.05 0.14 0.11 -0.21 
13.DOI Similarity 0.41 0.34 0.03 0.02 -0.13 -0.09 0.13 -0.04 
14. Board Ties 7.11 5.90 0.00 0.01 0.19 -0.09 -0.24 0.61 
15. Perf. of Dir other 
Appointments 1.23 6.58 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.04 
16. Social Clubs 1.57 3.01 0.06 -0.01 0.07 -0.09 -0.08 0.27 
17. Size of Dir. Home Firm 2.35 1.66 0.03 0.00 0.13 0.00 -0.23 0.21 
18. Businesses of Dir. Home Firm 0.83 0.67 0.03 0.03 0.11 -0.04 -0.22 0.15 
19. Size of Dir. other 
Appointments 3.55 2.22 0.02 0.01 0.19 -0.05 -0.22 0.36 
20. Businesses of Dir. 
Appointments 1.13 0.77 0.02 0.02 0.15 -0.08 -0.20 0.32 
21. Firm Size* 8.46 1.09 0.00 0.00 0.23 -0.06 -0.14 0.48 
22. Concentration Ratio Change 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.03 -0.07 
23. Outsider % 0.80 0.13 -0.02 -0.02 0.17 -0.04 -0.30 0.57 
24. Blockholder % 0.17 0.14 -0.09 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.18 
25. Institutional % 0.64 0.18 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.17 -0.22 -0.10 
26. Board Size 10.53 2.83 0.04 -0.01 0.06 -0.15 -0.18 0.86 
27. CEO Cont. Pay 0.55 0.27 -0.01 0.00 0.20 0.14 -0.22 0.23 
28. Appointments after CEO 3.85 3.65 0.04 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.20 
29. CEO is Chair 0.72 0.45 0.08 -0.02 0.05 -0.07 -0.10 0.16 
30. Education Diversity 0.16 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.09 0.04 0.10 -0.14 
31. Age Diversity 0.12 0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.14 0.01 0.24 -0.20 
* variable is log transformed 




Table 1                                       (continued from previous page) 
Variable 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
8. Perf. Of Dir Home Companies 0.05          
9. Director Tenure 0.48 0.01         
10. Product Market Similarity -0.09 -0.02 -0.06        
11. Foreign Market Similarity 0.17 0.06 0.00 0.10       
12. Diversification Similarity -0.16 0.01 -0.17 0.04 -0.25      
13.DOI Similarity -0.02 -0.06 0.08 -0.06 -0.49 0.15     
14. Board Ties 0.56 0.09 0.27 -0.06 0.50 -0.21 -0.17    
15. Perf. of Dir other 
Appointments 0.03 0.06 0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.07   
16. Social Clubs 0.27 0.03 0.22 -0.06 0.14 -0.14 -0.01 0.28 0.00  
17. Size of Dir. Home Firm 0.35 0.15 -0.04 -0.02 0.41 -0.08 -0.25 0.46 0.05 0.11 
18. Businesses of Dir. Home Firm 0.31 0.10 -0.03 -0.01 0.40 -0.09 -0.24 0.34 0.02 0.11 
19. Size of Dir. other 
Appointments 0.34 0.10 0.08 0.01 0.57 -0.23 -0.23 0.81 0.06 0.20 
20. Businesses of Dir. 
Appointments 0.31 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.53 -0.29 -0.21 0.72 0.03 0.20 
21. Firm Size* 0.37 0.03 0.22 -0.09 0.26 -0.16 -0.09 0.58 0.04 0.19 
22. Concentration Ratio Change -0.07 -0.03 -0.07 0.01 0.08 -0.02 -0.08 0.01 0.04 0.00 
23. Outsider % 0.44 0.05 0.32 -0.04 0.17 -0.15 -0.10 0.36 0.06 0.14 
24. Blockholder % -0.16 -0.02 -0.13 0.04 0.02 0.05 -0.03 -0.08 0.02 -0.04 
25. Institutional % -0.11 0.03 -0.12 0.04 0.10 0.02 -0.14 0.03 0.00 -0.03 
26. Board Size 0.65 0.01 0.58 -0.09 0.07 -0.15 0.05 0.49 0.02 0.24 
27. CEO Cont. Pay 0.21 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.19 -0.05 -0.16 0.23 0.01 0.11 
28. Appointments after CEO 0.13 -0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.13 0.03 0.13 0.01 -0.01 0.05 
29. CEO is Chair 0.11 0.00 0.01 -0.06 0.10 -0.12 -0.01 0.18 0.04 0.08 
30. Education Diversity -0.14 -0.06 0.08 0.02 -0.20 0.10 0.18 -0.21 -0.05 -0.08 
31. Age Diversity -0.22 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.17 0.09 0.09 -0.24 -0.02 -0.06 




Table 1                                       (continued from previous page) 
Variable 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
18. Businesses of Dir. Home Firm 0.81          
19. Size of Dir. other 
Appointments 0.48 0.38         
20. Businesses of Dir. 
Appointments 0.42 0.34 0.86        
21. Firm Size* 0.25 0.15 0.50 0.41       
22. Concentration Ratio Change 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.02 -0.02      
23. Outsider % 0.24 0.19 0.22 0.21 0.19 -0.05     
24. Blockholder % 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.19 0.03 -0.03    
25. Institutional % 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.28   
26. Board Size 0.08 0.04 0.24 0.21 0.44 -0.07 0.20 -0.20 -0.19  
27. CEO Cont. Pay 0.24 0.20 0.23 0.18 0.22 -0.01 0.16 -0.04 0.16 0.15 
28. Appointments after CEO -0.11 -0.10 -0.07 -0.07 0.06 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.10 0.30 
29. CEO is Chair 0.06 0.04 0.18 0.14 0.10 -0.04 0.18 -0.03 0.04 0.03 
30. Education Diversity -0.24 -0.22 -0.26 -0.28 -0.11 -0.02 -0.10 -0.06 -0.06 0.00 
31. Age Diversity -0.17 -0.18 -0.27 -0.24 -0.15 0.01 -0.20 0.13 0.01 -0.09 
 
Variable 27 28 29 30 
28. Appointments after CEO -0.04    
29. CEO is Chair 0.02 0.22   
30. Education Diversity -0.12 0.07 -0.03  




Table 2: Analysis of Study One effects on Return on Equity 
GLS analysis• 
 DV = Return on Equity 
  Predicted 
Effect 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 








Director Pay H1a ( + )  -0.010 
(0.012) 
  
Director Option Pay H1b ( + )  0.004 
(0.069) 
  
Director Ownership H1c ( + )  2.939† 
(1.755) 
  
Dummy for Est Value of 
Options 











Director Education H2a ( + )  0.000 
(0.001) 
  
Director TMT Experience H2b ( + )  0.002* 
(0.001) 
  
Dummy for Estimated 
Director Data 
  0.125**  
(0.037) 
  
Perf. Of Directors’ Home 
Companies 
H2c ( + )  0.053***  
(0.002) 
  
Director Tenure H2d ( + )  0.000 
(0.001) 
  
Product Market Similarity 
of Directors’ other Boards  
H2e ( + )  0.437 
(0.424) 
  
Foreign Market Similarity 
of Directors’ other Boards 




of Directors’ other Boards  
H2e ( + )  0.058 
(0.071) 
  
International Similarity of 
Directors’ other Boards  











Total Board Ties H3a ( + )  -0.024***  
(0.007) 
  
Perf. of Directors’ other 
Board Appointments 
H3b ( + )  -0.002 
(0.002) 
  
Social Club Memberships H3c ( + )  0.013† 
(0.007) 
  




 DV = Return on Equity 
  Predicted 
Effect 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 






Size of Dir. Home Firm H5a ( - )  0.052**  
(0.020) 
  
Number of Businesses of 
Dir. Home Firm 
H5b ( - )  -0.074* 
(0.037) 
  
Size of Dir. other Board 
Appointments 
H5c ( - )  0.023 
(0.020) 
  
Number of Businesses of 
Dir. other Board 
Appointments 












Incentives X Human 
Capital 
H4a ( + ) 
   
-0.017***  
(0.002) 
Information Demands X 
Human Capital 
H6a ( - ) 
   
-0.010***  
(0.001) 
Incentives X Social 
Capital 
H4b ( + ) 
   
0.023***  
(0.006) 
Information Demands X 
Social Capital 
H6b ( - ) 
   
0.012***  
(0.003) 

















































































 DV = Return on Equity 
  Predicted 
Effect 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
























Log Likelihood  -2737.20 -2158.16 -2368.78 -2275.23 
∆ fit    -579.0***  -368.4***  -93.55***  
† p < .10;* p < .05; **  p < .01; ***  p < .001; two-tailed tests. 


























































Figure 4: The interactive effect of board-level human capital and information demands on 


























Figure 5: The interactive effect of board-level social apital and information demands on 


























Table 3: Analysis of Study One effects on Market to Book Value 
GLS analysis• 
 DV = Market to Book Value 
  Predicted 
Effect 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 








Director Pay H1a ( + )  3.895***  
(1.666) 
  
Director Option Pay H1b ( + )  -4.747 
(4.535) 
  
Director Ownership H1c ( + )  -220.13† 
(132.149) 
  
Dummy for Est Value of 
Options 











Director Education H2a ( + )  0.060 
(0.077) 
  
Director TMT Experience H2b ( + )  -0.052 
(0.045) 
  
Dummy for Estimated 
Director Data 
  -12.61***  
(2.345) 
  
Perf. Of Directors’ Home 
Companies 
H2c ( + )  -0.329 
(0.253) 
  
Director Tenure H2d ( + )  0.034 
(0.037) 
  
Product Market Similarity 
of Directors’ other Boards  
H2e ( + )  19.821 
(43.483) 
  
Foreign Market Similarity 
of Directors’ other Boards 




of Directors’ other Boards  
H2e ( + )  7.611 
(4.846) 
  
International Similarity of 
Directors’ other Boards  











Total Board Ties H3a ( + )  -1.063* 
(0.429) 
  
Perf. of Directors’ other 
Board Appointments 
H3b ( + )  0.057 
(0.180) 
  
Social Club Memberships H3c ( + )  -0.076 
(0.483) 
  




 DV = Return on Equity 
  Predicted 
Effect 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 






Size of Dir. Home Firm H5a ( - )  -2.866* 
(1.146) 
  
Number of Businesses of 
Dir. Home Firm 
H5b ( - )  13.169***  
(2.430) 
  
Size of Dir. other Board 
Appointments 
H5c ( - )  -2.310† 
(1.287) 
  
Number of Businesses of 
Dir. other Board 
Appointments 












Incentives X Human 
Capital 
H4a ( + ) 
   
-0.460* 
(0.193) 
Information Demands X 
Human Capital 
H6a ( - ) 
   
-0.065 
(0.110) 
Incentives X Social 
Capital 
H4b ( + ) 
   
0.115 
(0.567) 
Information Demands X 
Social Capital 
H6b ( - ) 
   
0.734***  
(0.210) 















































































 DV = Return on Equity 
  Predicted 
Effect 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
























Log Likelihood  -10245.2 -10369.3 -10226.2 -10242.8 
∆ fit    124.1 -19.0***  -16.6***  
† p < .10;* p < .05; **  p < .01; ***  p < .001; two-tailed tests. 





































Figure 7: The interactive effect of board-level social apital and information demands on 
































Table 4: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of Key Variables for Study Two 
(N=1,875) 
Variable  Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Human Capital 0.00 3.16       
2. Social Capital 0.03 1.90 .32      
3. Board Structure 0.81 0.12 .25 .20     
4. Blockholder % 0.17 0.14 -.15 -.06 -.02    
5. Institutional % 0.65 0.18 -.10 .02 .07 .29   
6. Unrelated Divers. 0.21 0.34 -.13 .07 .09 -.03 .01  
7. Shareholder lawsuits 0.04 0.21 .03 .06 .00 -.05 .01 -.03 
8. Dir Protections 4.81 1.59 .08 .07 .26 -.01 .08 .17 
9. Director Pay* 11.30 1.07 .09 .14 .16 -.03 .16 .07 
10. % Option Pay 0.31 0.31 -.05 -.07 -.04 -.01 .18 -.05 
11. Dir Ownership 0.00 0.01 -.13 -.16 -.30 .01 -.23 -.08 
12. ROA 0.03 0.12 .13 .05 -.01 -.06 .05 .01 
13. Firm Size* 8.48 1.08 .30 .43 .19 -.19 .01 .07 
14. Board Size 10.49 2.84 .56 .36 .19 -.20 -.18 .06 
15. CEO Cont. Pay 0.55 0.27 .13 .21 .16 -.04 .16 -.02 
16. Appointments after CEO 4.05 3.79 .11 .01 -.04 -.07 -.10 -.02 
17. CEO is Chair 0.72 0.45 .04 .12 .17 -.03 .05 .08 
18. Age Diversity 0.12 0.04 -.12 -.16 -.19 .14 .01 -.06 
* variable is log transformed 
 
 
Variable 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
8. Dir Protections -.01          
9. Director Pay* -.02 .08         
10. % Option Pay .01 -.05 .43        
11. Dir Ownership -.01 -.22 -.12 .04       
12. ROA -.01 .02 .02 -.03 .02      
13. Firm Size* .07 -.06 .25 -.06 -.14 .08     
14. Board Size .06 .09 .06 -.14 -.18 .06 .44    
15. CEO Cont. Pay .03 .07 .20 .14 -.23 -.06 .22 .15   
16. Appointments after CEO .04 -.09 -.03 -.01 .02 .05 .07 .30 -.04  
17. CEO is Chair .01 .10 .05 -.07 -.11 .06 .11 .03 .02 .23 








Table 5: Analysis of Study Two Effects on Human/Social Capital 
GLS analysis•       













Intercept  -0.892 
(0.590) 
 4.642***  
(1.073) 






 7.416***  
(1.683) 








Blockholder % H2 ( - )   -0.815**  
(0.304) 
























































H6 ( + )    0.237* 
(0.097) 





 0.635***  
(0.036) 
 1.065***  
(0.067) 
 1.049***  
(0.068) 
 0.739***  
(0.094) 
 1.900***  
(0.201) 
 1.896***  
(0.201) 




































Dummy for Est 
Option Value 
 -0.664***  
(0.145) 
 -0.241**  
(0.345) 








ROA   0.932***  
(0.149) 
 0.461**  
(0.157) 








Firm Size   0.148***  
(0.043) 
 0.184***  
(0.049) 
 0.180***  
(0.049) 




















Board Size   0.147***  
(0.033) 
 -0.159**  
(0.051) 




 -0.209***  
(0.041) 
 -0.209***  
(0.041) 
     (continued on next page) 
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 0.034**  
(0.012) 
 0.034**  
(0.012) 
























Log Likelihood  -3678.39 -3644.80 -3642.78 -3050.31 -3023.305 -3023.104 
∆ fit    -33.59***  -2.02*  -27.01***  -0.201 
† p < .10;* p < .05; **  p < .01; ***  p < .001; two-tailed tests. 
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